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Biology and Philosophy

, Volume 19, Issue 5, pp 765–779 | Cite as

Natural selection and the traits of individual organisms

  • Joel Pust
Article

Abstract

It has recently been argued that origin essentialism regarding individual organisms entails that natural selection does not explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do. This paper defends this and related theses against Mohan Matthen’s recent objections.

Key words

explanation Matthen natural selection origin essentialism 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joel Pust
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA

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