There is a rather famous “Fitch argument” that not everything that is true is knowable. There is a rather famous “Mary argument” that is often used to argue that reductive physicalism is false. This paper sets out the two side by side as the Fitch Knowability Paradox and the Mary Knowability Paradox. It is found that they have the same logical form and thus the question of validity can be evaluated with the same tools. Likening the two is useful, since it avoids the problem that since the logical forms involved in intentional and experiential contexts are unknown, we cannot be in a position to evaluate whether the Mary is deductively valid without begging questions.
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Landini, G. Fitch and Mary. Axiomathes 30, 193–199 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-019-09443-0