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Group-to-individual (G2i) inferences: challenges in modeling how the U.S. court system uses brain data

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Abstract

Regardless of formalization used, one on-going challenge for AI systems that model legal proceedings is accounting for contextual issues, particularly where judicial decisions are made in criminal cases. The law assumes a rational approach to rule application in deciding a defendant’s guilt; however, judges and juries can behave irrationally. What should a model prize: efficiency, accuracy, or fairness? Exactly whether and how to incorporate the psychology of courtroom interactions into formal models or expert systems has only just begun to be examined in a serious fashion. Here, I outline data from the United States which suggest that trying to incorporate psychological biases into formal models of legal decision-making will be challenging. I focus on the use of neuroscience data in criminal trials, homing in on so-called group-to-individual (G2i) inferences. I argue that data which should be the most effective at swaying judicial decisions are in fact those most likely not to make a difference in the disposition of the case. I conclude that judges often assign culpability by ignoring what our best science regarding how human decision-making occurs.

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Notes

  1. CDA is an interdisciplinary approach to studying linguistic artifacts that focuses on (1) naturally occurring language artifacts, (2) units of analysis larger than individual words or sentences, (3) socio-cognitive strategies, and (4) the larger context for the linguistic act or acts (van Dijk 2008; Wodak 2008; see also Weiss and Wodak 2003). Its primary goal is to explore how ideologies, social structures, discriminatory practices, and power differentials are reflected in discourse. As Wodak and Myer remark, “One of the most significant principles of CDA is … that use of language is a ‘social practice’ which is both determined by social structure and contributes to stabilizing and changing that structure simultaneously” (2001, p. 7). In particular, it investigates “social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on,” in discourse (Wodak and Meyer 2001, p. 10). For example, an analysis of all news articles published in the United Kingdom the day after Saddam Hussein’s capture by U.S forces revealed that discussions of the deaths of Hussein’s two sons, Uday and Qusay, were always given in a passive or nominative voice. The sons “were killed,” “perished in a … blizzard of bullets,” or “the death of” or the “killing of” the sons was how the acts were referenced. The human agency involved in these deaths, that is, that U.S. troops shot and killed the brothers, is never directly discussed (Tenorio 2011). The choices made in describing Uday’s and Qusay’s deaths serve conceptually to diminish U.S. responsibility for the casualties. This in turn reinforces Western perspectives that diminish Saddam Hussein both as a person and as someone like us (someone in our in-group whose life has comparable value).

  2. It is probably worth pointing out that none of those released have reoffended (Melamed 2017).

  3. Special thanks are due to MK Kitzmiller and Shelby Lahey for their tireless coding of the database and for many conversations about what the G2i cases are telling us about how neuroscience data are used in criminal cases. Thanks are also due to two anonymous referees whose thoughtful comments significantly improved an earlier draft. This research was generously supported by the Weaver Institute for Law and Psychiatry at the University of Cincinnati.

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  1. Institute for Health Innovation, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, Kentucky, USA

    Valerie Gray Hardcastle

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Hardcastle, V.G. Group-to-individual (G2i) inferences: challenges in modeling how the U.S. court system uses brain data. Artif Intell Law 28, 51–68 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-018-9234-0

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