Abstract
Many scholars have suggested that organized violence in Chechnya has ended, and that Russia’s Chechenization policy and Ramzan Kadyrov’s presidency deserve the credit. We suggest that Putin has created a Frankenstein-like ruler over whom he risks losing control. As a result, the conflict only appears resolved, and we draw attention to both vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule that could lead to renewed violence. Vertically, the Chechen strongman and his growing clout in regional and federal politics have antagonized Russian siloviki. Horizontally, thousands of Chechens appear to be in a state of postponed blood feud toward Kadyrov, his clan, and the kadyrovtsy, his personal army. Backed by President Putin’s personal support, Kadyrov has put in motion a brutal machine of persecution over which some signs indicate he has lost control. Fear of extermination at the hands of the Kadyrov and his personal army has kept most prospective avengers at a bay. Once President Putin’s support wanes, locals will retaliate against Kadyrov and against Russian troops stationed in the republic, and Russian law enforcement circles will openly challenge Kadyrov’s rule. Putin’s support is only likely to wither if the costs of continued support (which grow with Kadyrov’s increasing independence) exceed the benefits (derived from an enforced peace). Either a renewed insurgency or ever more recalcitrant behavior would demonstrate a level of interest misalignment that could induce Putin to withdraw his support. Such a turn of events would render these horizontal and vertical cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule more noticeable and would likely to cause the frozen conflict in Chechnya to thaw, leading to a new civil war.
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31 January 2019
Missing acknowledgment.
Notes
For a discussion of these cyclical understanding of conflict, please see the introduction article of this journal issue.
Ethnic-Chechen Vostok forces also fought against the Georgians in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and have volunteered to fight in Ukraine.
The principal-agent problem occurs when a principal (actor, individual etc.) is not able to monitor and control perfectly the behavior of the agent who has been hired, as it were, to accomplish set goals, but is not acting exactly the way the principal wants (Mitnick 1992).
This is often called “indirect rule” because the center rules by proxy through an ethnic native and has arguably served to defuse the insurgency and contain nationalistic conflict in the North Caucasus (Siroky et al. 2013, p. 268). Indirect rule allows the central leaders to establish a distinctive administration in multicultural societies where co-ethnic indirect rulers control their ethnic groups, which is generally perceived as more legitimate (Hechter 2013). In exchange for appointing them, these indirect rulers provide some benefits to the central authorities. These benefits may include taxes, military support in form of manpower during wartime, and containing nationalism. Although indirect rule allows the central authorities to develop special agency relationships with the local rulers (indirect rulers) and contain rising nationalistic conflict, it is not without challenges. A major challenge with indirect rule is the emergence of principal-agent problems, a dilemma that is widely cited in political science (Eisenhardt 1989) and economics (Grossman and Hart 1983), which stems in this case from appointing Ramzan Kadyrov as the “president” of Chechnya, and devolving power to pro-Russian Chechens rather than controlling Chechnya directly from Moscow.
The Vaynakh people embraced Islam in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
An interesting fact about the gunmen is their inexperience, which is visible in their attacks and suggests that they do not have links to existing insurgency-based training.
For a detailed discussion of private armies, and secessionist militias the Chechen warlords established based clan structure, and defected to Russian federal forces, please see Šmíd and Mareš (2015).
Along with growing vertical and horizontal grievances, there is an emerging resentment between Kadyrov and his personal army, kadyrovtsy.
In addition, there is some evidence of emerging tensions between Kadyrov and his personal army, the kadyrovtsy. According to some insiders, many feel antagonized and resentful because of his ill-treatment of his subordinates.
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Souleimanov, E.A., Abbasov, N. & Siroky, D.S. Frankenstein in Grozny: vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule. Asia Eur J 17, 87–103 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0520-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0520-y