A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games
- 49 Downloads
We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global effciency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al.
KeywordsSet games value axiomatic characterization
2000 MR Subject Classification91A12 91A44
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Aarts, H., Funaki, Y., Hoede, C. Set games. Memorandum 1148, Faculty of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, 1993Google Scholar
- 3.Gambarelli, G., Owen, G. Indirect Control of Corporations. Working paper, Dept. of Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics and Application, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy, 1992Google Scholar
- 4.Hoede, C. Graphs and games. Memorandum 1065, Faculty of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, 1992Google Scholar