Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 417–424 | Cite as

A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games

Original papers

Abstract

We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global effciency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al.

Keywords

Set games value axiomatic characterization 

2000 MR Subject Classification

91A12 91A44 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied MathematicsNorthwestern Polytechnical UniversityXi’anChina

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