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Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a Tu-game

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Abstract

In this article, a case of partial cooperation in a game theory framework is studied. The interest is on a bi-level Stackelberg problem where one of the players is the leader and the rest are the followers, involved in a TU-game. The continuity, with respect to the leader’s choice, of the Shapley value function and the core correspondence of the TU-game is investigated.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Physics, University of Sassari, Via Vienna 2, 07100, Sassari, Italy

    C. A. Pensavalle

  2. Department of Architectural Science, University of Genova, Stradone S. Agostino 37, 16123, Genova, Italy

    G. Pieri

Authors
  1. C. A. Pensavalle
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  2. G. Pieri
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Correspondence to C. A. Pensavalle.

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Pensavalle, C.A., Pieri, G. Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a Tu-game. Decisions Econ Finan 36, 89–98 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-011-0122-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-011-0122-2

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