Economics of Governance

, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp 75–90 | Cite as

Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing

Original Paper

Abstract

This paper studies how reputation enforces socially cooperative behavior in road racing in the New Orleans metro area. We find that reputation mechanisms have a much stronger effect for frequent road racers than for members of the New Orleans Track Club. We find that club membership cuts cheating in half while a runner who has finished at least one-third of the 2013 running season does not cheat. Thus, self-governance eliminates corruption when there is a reputational mechanism in place. Since data on informal running clubs are unavailable, our analysis underestimates the effect of club membership on socially cooperative behavior in road racing.

Keywords

Self-governance Cheating Road race 

JEL Classification

J2 J16 J22 J71 L83 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loyola University New OrleansNew OrleansUSA

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