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Contests with dominant strategies

  • Carmen BeviáEmail author
  • Luis Corchón
Research Article

Abstract

In this paper, we first characterize the class of contest success functions (CSFs) that yield contests with equilibria in dominant strategies. Then we study the optimal contest as a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classical criteria of Wald, Laplace, Hurwicz and Savage. We find that the CSF that maximizes aggregate effort under these criteria has the form of an additively separable cutoff CSF.

Keywords

Contests Dominant strategies Optimality under uncertainty Additively separable CSF 

JEL classification

C7 D7 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Z. Méder, S. Heinsalu, N. Kudryashova, J. Rueda-Llano, H. Sabourian, B. Schipper, the associate editor and four anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Thanks to the MOMA network under the project ECO2014-57673-REDT for financial support. The first author acknowledges financial support from ECO2014 53051, SGR2014-515 and PROMETEO/2013/037. The second author acknowledges financial support from ECO2014_57442_P, ECO2017_87769_P, MDM 2014-0431 and S2015/HUM-3444.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Fundamentos del Análisis EconómicoUniversidad de AlicanteAlicanteSpain
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversidad Carlos III de MadridMadridSpain

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