Abstract.
We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium.
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Hehenkamp, B., Qin, CZ. & Stuart, C. Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings. J Evol Econ 9, 211–224 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081