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Technological standards with local externalities and decentralized behaviour

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Abstract.

We model a situation in which agents must choose between two technologies that operate under local, positive network externalities. We find that decentralized behaviour can lead to the emergence of a technical standard, but can also result in a variety of other equilibria. Policy to eliminate non-standardized equilibria can be effected, but in some cases it may be very costly.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Economics Department, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, Canada, , , , , , CA

    Robin Cowan

  2. Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Porter Hall 208, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA, , , , , , US

    John H. Miller

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  1. Robin Cowan
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  2. John H. Miller
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Cowan, R., Miller, J. Technological standards with local externalities and decentralized behaviour. J Evol Econ 8, 285–296 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050065

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050065

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