Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Entrepreneurship and institutional change

The case of surrogate motherhood

  • Regular Article
  • Published:
Journal of Evolutionary Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Entrepreneurs do more than just buy low and sell high; they sometimes also change our institutions, including our categories of thought. New institutional economics has been examining incentives that drive individuals to bring about market-supporting institutional arrangements. There is, however, an aspect of entrepreneurship conducive to institutional changes that has been neglected by contemporary institutionalist theories and that remains underdeveloped in entrepreneurship research. When and how does entrepreneurship bring about institutional change? I suggest that entrepreneurs are agents of institutional change when cultural categorization is ambiguous with regard to the proper and permissible applications of novel artifacts. Motherhood, for example, used to be a simple category, but surrogacy changed that radically. Examining newspaper evidence, social surveys, statutory law, and judicial cases, I show how entrepreneurs, by provoking a change in interpretation and judgment, challenged the existing institutional legal ordering of procreation turning a technically feasible method of surrogacy into current practice.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This advertisement appeared in Junction City (Kansas) Daily Union on Sep. 10, 1984.

  2. Different categories of entrepreneurship have been proposed. For example, Arjo Klamer (2011) and Joel Mokyr (2013) refer to cultural entrepreneurs, Julie Batillana et al. (2009) and David Li et al. (2006) analyze institutional entrepreneurs, and Douglass North (1990, 2005) speaks about organizational entrepreneurs (political, social or economic). Peter Boettke and Chris Coyne (2007) provide an excellent summary of the different aspects of institutional, social and political categories of entrepreneurship. I do not make any analytical distinction between these conceptual categories because entrepreneurship throughout these categories is always driven by the imagination of future projects and the pursuit of untapped gains.

  3. Acemoglu et al. (2005) outline four complementary views of institutional change: Institutions might change following efficiency considerations, because of ideological differences, incidentally (as a result of human action but not human design), or as a result of choices of politically powerful groups.

  4. In this scheme t = (1, 2,...) and i = (1, 2,...).

  5. See, for example, Greif and Tadelis (2010).

  6. For a summary of the current thought on institutions see, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) or Hodgson and Calatrava (2006).

  7. According to Masahiko Aoki (2011), shared expectations “are salient ways of the societal games played, being played, and believed to be played in a population.” Aoki calls these beliefs deep institutional structures. The patterns of these shared beliefs are “summarily and publicly represented by laws, norms, organizations, social rules, and other external artifacts, which may be referred to as substantive forms of institutions.” It should be made clear that the definition of institutional rules I use corresponds to Aoki’s substantive forms of institutions insofar as the laws, norms and organizations are backed by coercive force.

  8. For a discussion of the concept of legitimacy, see Levi, Sacks and Tyler (2009) and also Fuller (1969), according to whom the authority of legal rules ultimately rests on people’s moral attitudes.

  9. A prominent example of generalized Darwinism has been developed by Hodgson and Knudsen (2010, 2012). Different variants of such a generalization can be found in Pelikán (2011, 2012) and Witt (2002).

  10. Furthermore, McCloskey (2010) argues that “a rhetorical change around 1700 concerning markets and innovations and bourgeoisie” is the crucial explanation for the Industrial Revolution: “[I]n the eighteenth century the ideal and the material crossed wires, and powered the modern world” (p. 42).

  11. In the scheme, the entrepreneur j may be both an arbitrageur or an innovator. Since \(j\in \left \{ 1,2,...\right \} \), there will be different entrepreneurs who act and interact with each other while engaging in different kinds of persuasion.

  12. Koppl et al. (2014) mention a generally related problem: “I cannot sell you an apple for a dollar unless our ideas of ‘apple’, ‘dollar’, and ‘trade’ are more or less the same.” Earl and Potts (2004) call this a “framing problem.” It is my contention that an important part of the framing problem is legitimacy: A crucial task of entrepreneurial persuasion will often be to convince others that carrying out monetary exchanges in diverse artifacts is proper and permissible. If persuasion fails, brokerage to circumvent exchange taboos may take place to intermediate the otherwise disreputable exchanges (Rossman 2014).

  13. For a discussion of the second condition, see Swedberg (2002). Schumpeter had originally recognized that coming up with new combinations of existing resources is not the difficult part of entrepreneurial effort. Rather, as Swedberg points out, “the [original Schumpeterian] entrepreneur ... realizes that it is absolutely imperative to get the support of other people ... [who] will not by themselves turn into persons who are capable of carrying out new and creative tasks. Most people just want to do things the same way that they have always done them, ... what the entrepreneur has to do in this situation is to buy them over to his side” (pp. 234–235). This emphasis on the social element of entrepreneurship disappeared from the widely quoted Schumpeter (1934) edition of Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development.

  14. See, for example, Downs (1957) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).

  15. The form of a political entity k will be determined by a particular institutional order that sets rules for the degree of separation of legislative, executive and judiciary powers. Since k∈{1,2,...}, the particular political entity k may be, depending on the institutional setting, at the same time a legislator, a judge, and an executioner (such as in cases of small group governance). At the other end of the spectrum, there will be three independent political entities (as is common in modern constitutional democracies) carrying out the legislative, executive and judiciary tasks.

  16. 16 Ambiguity implies a close set of interpretations among which one might choose, vagueness implies a set of yet undefined choices. I thank David Harper for reminding me of this distinction.

  17. Often the biblical handmaiden Hagar has been presented as the archetypal surrogate. In fact, a number of US clinics used the name Hagar as a means to legitimize their enterprises in the early 1980s. Hagar, who gave birth to Abraham’s child, however, cannot be considered the first surrogate. She became one of Abraham’s wives, gave birth to his son Ishmael and was unquestionably the mother of that child. For a discussion, see Krimmel (1983), De Marco (1987) or Rothman (1988).

  18. The discovery that “all animals—including humans—come from eggs” took place in 1665. Twelve years later, in 1677, the use of the microscope to study bodily fluids led to “one of the most stupendous discoveries in the history of science: the observation of spermatozoa” (Cobb 2012).

  19. “The first reported case of [homologous] artificial insemination of a human being occurred in 1799, when a husband’s semen was used to impregnate his wife. AIH [homologous artificial insemination]occurred more frequently in England after this early success and subsequently spread to France. ... An American researcher recorded successful experimentation with AIH as early as 1866, but he voluntarily abandoned the technique, perhaps worried that it was immoral” (Smith 1968).

  20. Artificial insemination was mostly a secret practice. Smith (1968) estimates that “during this century, an average of 1,000-1,200 artificial-insemination children have been conceived in the United States each year.” Wadlington (1969) adds that “the educated guesses even within the medical profession vary widely. Recent estimates of the annual number of births through AID range from 1,000 to more than 20,000.”

  21. The fall in the number of babies available for adoption in the 1970s has been mentioned in Bachrach (1986), Berkov (1976), Landes (1978) and Posner (1987, 1989), among others. The shortage might be explained by the interplay of several factors—the greater availability of contraception and abortion, and the changing economic and social circumstances of single mothers. Generally, it is the case that the number of suitable unwanted babies fell in the 1970s.

  22. Surrogate Mothers Seen In Future, Ottawa Citizen, September 8, 1979.

  23. Test-tube Births Face Medical, Legal Pitfalls, Saskatoon (Saskatchewan) Star-Phoenix, March 10, 1980.

  24. The first statute regulating artificial insemination was adopted in 1964 in Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21). In 1983 there were 23 other states where artificial insemination legislation was in force (Wadlington 1983).

  25. See Flannery (1978).

  26. Posner (1994) notes that the “common law did not recognize adoption. Recognition came in American statutes passed in the middle of the nineteenth century; the first English statute authorizing adoption was not passed until 1926.”

  27. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

  28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

  29. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

  30. The rights to establish a parent–child relationship have generally been determined by the legal status of the marriage contract (see Wagner 1990).

  31. Private adoptions were not allowed in some states. This means that all adoptions were required to take place through a licensed adoption agency that matched children with parents interested in adoption. In a surrogacy agreement the “relinquishment of the child to the sperm donor (and possibly his wife, if he is married) ... would be equivalent to a private adoptive placement” (Wadlington 1983) and would thus be illegal.

  32. This is because the surrogate must be impregnated by a man who is not married to her and therefore “one of the biological parents of the resulting offspring is married to someone else” (Keane 1980).

  33. Keane argued that problems arise when the surrogate is not married. “Because the child of a single surrogate mother is born out of wedlock, he is definitely illegitimate. Traditionally such a status carried numerous legal disabilities, especially with respect to inheritance” (Keane 1980). For the examination of a potential conflict between the existing legal provision and the practice of surrogacy with regard to determining parentage, see Wadlington (1983).

  34. Stand-In Mother - Surrogate Mother Agrees to Bear Child for Married Couple, Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1980.

  35. Surrogate Motherhood Becoming an American Growth Industry, Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1983.

  36. The Surrogate Baby Boom, Washington Post, January 25, 1983.

  37. At Least A Dozen Other Surrogate Mothers in Kentucky Program, Associated Press, Nov. 15, 1980.

  38. Issue and Debate: When Women Bear Children for Others, New York Times, Dec. 22, 1980.

  39. Aid to Childless Pair, Lodi News-Sentinel, February 13, 1980.

  40. Suit to Test Surrogate Parent’s Rights, The Bryan Times, November 14, 1981.

  41. Issue and Debate, New York Times, December 22, 1980.

  42. Stand-In Mother, Washington Post, February 11, 1980.

  43. Issue and Debate, New York Times December 22, 1980.

  44. Judge Rejects Couple’s Petition To Use ’Surrogate’ Mother, Associated Press, Jan. 29, 1980.

  45. Judge To Rule on Custody Case Involving Surrogate Mother, New York Times, Nov. 15, 1981.

  46. Surrogate Mother Issue Remains Unresolved, United Press International, Nov. 26, 1981.

  47. Judge Issues Ruling In Surrogate Mother Case, Wilmington Star, Nov. 26, 1981.

  48. Firm Provides Surrogate Mothers, United Press International, March 2, 1982.

  49. East Coast Contract Baby Born to Surrogate Mother, Pittsburgh Press, Dec. 28, 1982.

  50. Associated Press, Frankfort (Kentucky), December 2, 1981.

  51. Associated Press, Detroit, March 28, 1979.

  52. Child Born to Surrogate Mother Legally Adopted By Father And His Wife, St. Petersburg (Florida) Evening Independent, March 30, 1979.

  53. Wulf H. Utian, who performed the IVF, said he “ would presume it’s a world’s first” transplantation in which the child born to a surrogate would have the genetic characteristics of the commissioning parents (United Press International, “Woman To Have Friends’ ‘Test Tube’ Child,” August 27, 1985). In a letter to The New England Journal Of Medicine, Utian mentioned that, although there was no chance of the couple having their own child, due to the cesarean hysterectomy of the wife, “the couple remained strongly committed to having their own genetic child and requested that our in vitro program consider embryo transfer to the uterus of a friend who was interested and willing to act as a surrogate” (Utian et al. 1985). The Mount Sinai Clinic did not have a surrogacy program and the procedure was carried out only because of the special circumstances.

  54. Free Lance—Star, Virginia, February 21, 1986.

  55. Court Ruling May Pave The Way, Ludington Daily News, March 14, 1986.

  56. For a discussion of the legal doctrines for establishing parenthood, see, for example, Snyder (2006) or Spivack (2010).

  57. Surrogate Parenthood Laws Opposed by Jersey Bishops, New York Times, Dec. 4, 1986.

  58. Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith, Instruction on respect for human life, March 1987, available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_c faith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html.

  59. Gallup/Newsweek Poll released on January 8, 1987.

  60. Roper/U.S. News and World Report Poll, released on April 1, 1987.

  61. Gallup Poll, released on April 13, 1987.

  62. Gallup/Newsweek Poll, released on January 8, 1987.

  63. Conversely, the proportion of the population who disagreed with the ruling of Judge Sorkow and believed the mother had a right to change her mind dropped to 14 % as compared to a January estimate of 26 % who believed the surrogate mother should get custody if she changed her mind (Gallup/Newsweek Poll, released on January 8, 1987, CBS News/New York Times Poll released on April 8 1987 and Gallup Poll, released on April 13, 1987).

  64. A survey conducted in May 1987 identified several reasons for opposing surrogacy (Kane, Parsons and Associates/Parents Magazine Poll, released on May 20, 1987). The most important of these was the strength of the maternal bond. The statement that “despite what a woman says before giving birth, the bond between mother and child is so strong after birth that many women find it too difficult to give up the baby” was convincing to 57 % of the population. Second, 46 % of the population found “too many legal problems surrounding surrogate motherhood” to be a convincing reason to oppose surrogacy.

  65. Gallup/Newsweek Poll, released on January 8, 1987 and Kane, Parsons and Associates/Parents Magazine Poll, released on May 20, 1987.

  66. See Eisenberg et al. (2012) or Ramello (2012) on the function of trials in legal reform.

  67. Both of the landmark cases involved surrogates who did not receive proper psychological screening. In the case of Whitehead, the psychological report that warned against her potential difficulties with parting from the child was lost and was not considered by the parents. In the case of Johnson, the psychological screening of the surrogate was bypassed as Johnson was contacted privately by the couple, who did not go through an agency selection process.

  68. In 1986, Jan Sutton, the founder of The National Association of Surrogate Mothers, demonstrated the reliability of trust as an enforcement mechanism: “Out of the 300 to 500 births to surrogate mothers in this country, only three women have asked to keep the children they have borne” (Surrogate Moms Form Lobbying Group, Associated Press, November 12, 1986).

References

  • Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson JA (2005) Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. Handbook of economic growth 1:385–472

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu D, Robinson JA (2012) Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty. Crown Publishers, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Alvarez SA, Barney JB (2007) Discovery and creation: Alternative theories of entrepreneurial action. Strateg Entrep J 1(1–2):11–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson TL, Hill PJ (1975) The evolution of property rights: a study of the american west. J Law Econ 18(1):163–179

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson TL, Hill PJ (1990) The race for property rights. J Law Econ 33 (1):177–197

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andrews LB (1995) Beyond doctrinal boundaries: a legal framework for surrogate motherhood. Virginia Law Review 81:2343

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aoki M (2011) Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions and individual beliefs. J Econ Behav Organ 79(1–2):20–34

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow KJ (1974) Limited knowledge and economic analysis. Am Econ Rev 64 (1):xiii–10

    Google Scholar 

  • Bachrach CA (1986) Adoption plans, adopted children, and adoptive mothers. J Marriage Fam 48(2):243–253

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Battilana J, Leca B, Boxenbaum E (2009) How actors change institutions: towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. Acad Manag Ann 3(1):65–107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumol WJ (1990) Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive, and destructive. J Polit Econ 98(5):893–921

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berkov B, Sklar J (1976) Does illegitimacy make a difference? A study of the life chances of illegitimate children in California. Popul Dev Rev 2(2):201–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke PJ, Coyne CJ (2007) Context matters: institutions and entrepreneurship. Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 5(3):135–209

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Casson M (1982) The entrepreneur: an economic theory. Rowman & Littlefield

  • Coase R (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica 4(16):386–405

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cobb M (2012) An amazing 10 years: the discovery of egg and sperm in the 17th century. Reprod Domest Anim p 47

  • De Marco D (1987) The conflict between reason and will in the legislation of surrogate motherhood. American Journal of Jurisprudence 32:23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dew N (2008) On effectuation and new markets. In: Effectuation: elements of entrepreneurial expertise, pp 240–254. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos, UK; Northampton, MA

  • Dew N, Read S, Sarasvathy SD, Wiltbank R (2011) On the entrepreneurial genesis of new markets: Effectual transformations versus causal search and selection. J Evol Econ 21(2):231–253

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Downs A (1957) An economic theory of political action in a democracy. J Polit Econ p 135–150

  • Earl PE, Potts J (2004) The market for preferences. Camb J Econ 28 (4):619–633

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckhardt JT, Shane SA (2003) Opportunities and entrepreneurship. J Manag 29(3):333–349

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenberg T, Robinson N, Kalantry S (2012) Litigation as a measure of well-being

  • Epstein RA (1995) Simple rules for a complex world. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Flannery DM, Weisman CD, Lipsett CR, Braverman AN (1978) Test tube babies: legal issues raised by in vitro fertilization. Geo LJ 67:1295

    Google Scholar 

  • Foss NJ, Klein PG, Kor YY, Mahoney JT (2008) Entrepreneurship, subjectivism, and the resource-based view: toward a new synthesis. Strateg Entrep J 2(1):73–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuller LL (1969) The morality of law: revised edition. Yale University Press, revised edition

  • Godley AC, Casson MC (2014) ‘Doctor, Doctor...’ entrepreneurial diagnosis and market making. Journal of Institutional Economics p 1–21

  • Görling S, Rehn A (2008) Accidental ventures - a materialist reading of opportunity and entrepreneurial potential. Scand J Manag 24(2):94–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greif A, Tadelis S (2010) A theory of moral persistence: crypto-morality and political legitimacy. J Comp Econ 38(3):229–244

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hadfield GK (2011) The dynamic quality of law: the role of judicial incentives and legal human capital in the adaptation of law. J Econ Behav Organ 79(1–2):80–94. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.006. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268111000709

  • Hayek FA (1979) Law, legislation, and liberty: the political order of a free people, vol 3. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Henrekson M, Sanandaji T (2011) The interaction of entrepreneurship and institutions. Journal of Institutional Economics 7(01):47–75

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson GM (2007) Institutions and individuals: interaction and evolution. Organ Stud 28(1):95–116

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson GM, Calatrava J (2006) What are institutions. Journal of Economic Issues 40(1):1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson GM, Knudsen T (2010) Darwin’s conjecture: the search for general principles of social and economic evolution. University Of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson GM, Knudsen T (2012) Agreeing on generalised Darwinism: A response to Pavel Pelikań. J Evol Econ 22(1):9–18

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Howitt P, Clower R (2000) The emergence of economic organization. J Econ Behav Organ 41(1):55–84

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keane NP (1980) Legal problems of surrogate motherhood. S Ill ULJ 5:147

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner IM (1973) Competition and entrepreneurship. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Klamer A (2011) Cultural entrepreneurship. The Review of Austrian Economics 24(2):141–156

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein PG (2008) Opportunity discovery, entrepreneurial action, and economic organization. Strateg Entrep J 2(3):175–190

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koppl R, Kauffman S, Felin T, Longo G (2014) Economics for a creative world. Journal of Institutional Economics FirstView:1–31

    Google Scholar 

  • Krimmel HT (1983) The case against surrogate parenting. Hast Cent Rep 13 (5):35–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuchař P (2014) The birth of surrogate motherhood law: an economic analysis of institutional reform. Paper presented at the international society for new institutional economics conference (ISNIE), Durham

  • Kuran T (1995) Private truths, public lies: the social consequences of preference falsification. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Landes EM, Posner RA (1978) The economics of the baby shortage. J Leg Stud 7(2):323–348

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levi M, Sacks A, Tyler T (2009) Conceptualizing legitimacy, measuring legitimating beliefs. Am Behav Sci 53(3):354–375

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li DD, Feng J, Jiang H (2006) Institutional entrepreneurs. Am Econ Rev 96(2):358–362

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Libecap GD (1978) Economic variables and the development of the law: the case of western mineral rights. J Econ Hist 38(02):338–362

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Libecap GD (1994) Contracting for property rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • McCloskey DN, Klamer A (1995) One quarter of GDP is persuasion. Am Econ Rev 85(2):191–195

    Google Scholar 

  • McCloskey DN (2010) Bourgeois dignity: why economics can’t explain the modern world. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Meerhaeghe MAGv (2003) The lost chapter of Schumpeter’s ‘Economic Development’. In: Backhaus J (ed) Joseph Alois Schumpeter: entrepreneurship, style and vision, The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences, pp 233–243. Springer

  • Ménard C (1995) Markets as institutions versus organizations as markets? Disentangling some fundamental concepts. J Econ Behav Organ 28(2):161–182

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mokyr J (2013) Cultural entrepreneurs and the origins of modern economic growth. Scand Econ Hist Rev 61(1):1–33

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • North DC (2005) Understanding the process of economic change. Princeton University Press, Princeton. revised edition

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pacheco DF, York JG, Dean TJ, Sarasvathy SD (2010) The coevolution of institutional entrepreneurship: a tale of two theories. J Manag 36(4):974–1010

    Google Scholar 

  • Pelikán P (2011) Evolutionary developmental economics: how to generalize Darwinism fruitfully to help comprehend economic change. J Evol Econ 21(2):341–366

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pelikán P (2012) Agreeing on generalized Darwinism: a response to Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjoern Knudsen. J Evol Econ 22(1):1–8

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Persson T, Tabellini GE (2000) Political economics: explaining economic policy. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner RA (1987) Regulation of the market in adoptions. BUL Rev 67:59

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner RA (1989) Ethics and economics of enforcing contracts of surrogate motherhood. J Contemp Health Law Policy 5:21

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner RA (1994) Sex and reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner RA (2007) Economic analysis of law. Aspen Publishers, 7th edition

  • Ramello GB (2012) Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: Another view of judicial efficiency. Int Rev Law Econ 32(1):63–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rossman G (2014) Obfuscatory relational work and disreputable exchange. Sociol Theory 32(1):43–63

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rothman BK (1988) Motherhood: beyond patriarchy. Nova L Rev 13:481

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarasvathy SD (2003) Entrepreneurship as a science of the artificial. J Econ Psychol 24(2):203–220

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sarasvathy SD (2008) Effectuation: elements of entrepreneurial expertise. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos, UK; Northampton, MA

  • Schumpeter JA (1912) Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Eine Untersuchung uber Unternehmergewinn, Kapital, Kredit, Zins und den Konjunkturzyklus. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter JA (1934) The theory of economic development. An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest and the business cycle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter JA (1942) Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. Unwin, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter JA (2002) The economy as a whole (Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 1912 [english translation by U. Backhaus]). Industry & Innovation 9 (1–2):93–145

    Google Scholar 

  • Shane SA (2003) A general theory of entrepreneurship: the individual-opportunity nexus. Edward Elgar Publishing

  • Smith GP (1968) Through a test tube darkly: artificial insemination and the law. Mich Law Rev 67(1):127–150

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Snyder S, Byrn M (2006) The use of prebirth parentage orders in surrogacy proceedings. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 889073, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY

  • Spivack C (2010) The law of surrogate motherhood in the united states. American Journal of Comparative Law 58:97–114

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swedberg R (2002) The economic sociology of capitalism Weber and Schumpeter. J Class Sociol 2(3):227–255

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Utian WH, Sheean LA, Goldfarb JM, Kiwi R (1985) Successful pregnancy after in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer from an infertile woman to a surrogate. N Engl J Med 313(21):1351–1352

    Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg VJ (2014) Darwinian paradigm, cultural evolution and human purposes: on F.A. Hayek’s evolutionary view of the market. J Evol Econ 24(1):35–57

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wadlington W (1969) Artificial insemination: the dangers of a poorly kept secret. Nw UL Rev 64:777

    Google Scholar 

  • Wadlington W (1983) Artificial conception: the challenge for family law. Virginia Law Review 69(3):465–514

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner RE (2010) Mind, society, and human action: time and knowledge in a theory of social economy. Routledge

  • Wagner WJ (1990) The contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights: the natural endowment critique. Case W Res L Rev 41:1

    Google Scholar 

  • Witt U (2002) How evolutionary is Schumpeter’s theory of economic development? Industry and Innovation 9(1–2):7–22

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Witt U (2008) What is specific about evolutionary economics? J Evol Econ 18 (5):547–575

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wohlgemuth M (2000) Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly. J Evol Econ 10(3):273–295

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wohlgemuth M (2002) Evolutionary approaches to politics. Kyklos 55(2):223–246

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wohlgemuth M (2005) Schumpeterian political economy and Downsian public choice: alternative economic theories of democracy. In: Marciano A, Josselin JM (eds) A political economy approach. New horizons in Law and Economics. Edward Elgar Cheltenham

Download references

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Niclas Berggren, Enrico Colombatto, Giuseppe Eusepi, Aristides Hatzis, Dan Klein, Hugh McLachlan and Richard Wagner for helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank to participants at the 2014 Prague Conference on Political Economy for their ideas and appreciate the comments of discussants at the 2014 Southern Economic Association conference in Atlanta, GA. Finally, I thank to participants at the Texas Tech Free Market Institute Research Workshop and to participants at the New York University Colloquium on Market Institutions and Economic Processes for good discussion. This work benefits from the thoughts and insights of two reviewers, whose generous feedback has been of great value in clarifying and sharpening some of the ideas presented here. All remaining errors are my own.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Pavel Kuchař.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kuchař, P. Entrepreneurship and institutional change. J Evol Econ 26, 349–379 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-015-0433-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-015-0433-5

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation