Abstract
We study the stochastic stability of a dynamic trading process in an exchange economy. We use a simplified version of a trading model à la Shapley and Shubik (J Polit Econ 85:937–968, 1977). Two types of agents equipped with Leontief preferences trade goods in markets by offering endowments, and actual trades occur at market clearing prices. Better behavior tends to spread through the same type of agents by imitation, and agents also make mistakes occasionally. We provide a sufficient condition for the perturbed dynamic process to have a unique stochastically stable state that is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. In this sense, we give a rationale for Walrasian behavior.
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Notes
Chatterji and Ghosal (2004) also borrows a similar model for studying the local stability of competitive equilibria.
Namely, any \((( b^i )_{i\in {\mathcal I}_{I}}, (q^i )_{i \in {\mathcal I}_{II}})\) such that there is a pair \(b,q\geqq 0\) such that b = K − q, and b i = b for all \(i\in{\mathcal I}_{I}\) and q i = q for all \(i\in{\mathcal I}_{II}\).
Recently, this trading mechanism was used by Chatterji and Ghosal (2004) for a study of the stability of competitive equilibria.
This ensures that the price is well defined by Eq. 10 below.
M0(z, z′) is the probability of a transition from z to z′.
I.e., i) if z ∈ Λ, and \(z'\not\in \Lambda\), then M 0(z, z′) = 0; ii) if z, z′ ∈ Λ, then there exists a k such that \(M^{(k)}_0(z,z')>0\).
Cf. Vega-Redondo (1997), p. 379, proof of Proposition 1.
Of course, P I (b, b′) = 1 when b = b′; and P II (q, q′) = 1 when q = q′.
For “z b,q|b′” we use “|” to indicate b′ ∈ S. For “z b,q||q′”, we use “||” to indicate q′ ∈ T.
We cannot use Lemmas 1 and 2 to move states in Z * in general because, when n < A/(A − 1), we have (1/A)q n < K − b n − 1 and (1/A)b n > K − q n − 1. In this case, Lemmas 1 and 2 do not apply.
When n = 1, we understand \(b_{n-1}=\hat b\), and \(q_{n-1}=\hat q\). For \(p^+_I\) and \(p^+_{II}\), we understand that they are defined over those n where \(n+1\leqq \bar n\).
When \(A\geqq 2\), we have \(p^-_I > b_n/q_n\) for even not-necessarily-small δ, as can be verified by Eq. 29. At the same time, by definition of n **, we have n ** = 0 when \(A\geqq 2\).
Cf. Proof of Lemma 3b.
Throughout this proof, when n = 1, we understand b n − 1 and \(\widetilde b_{n-1}\) as \(\hat b\), and q n − 1 and \(\widetilde q_{n-1}\) as \(\hat q\).
This proof uses Lemmas 1 and 2, and Remarks 2 and 4. Lemmas 1 and 2 and Remark 4 do not require δ to be small. For \(A\geqq 2\), the assertion in Remark 2 holds even when δ is not necessarily small (see Footnote 14). Therefore, this proof of Theorem 1 for \(A\geqq 2\) does not require δ to be small.
For this general context, we have some examples of fixed parameters K, δ, A, m for which \(\mu^*(b^*,q^*)=\mu^*(\widetilde b^*,\widetilde q^*)=1/2\). One such set of parameters are K = 42, δ = 1, A = 1/20, and m = 20.
Proofs of all lemmas are given in Appendix II.
This proof uses Lemmas 1, 2, and 5′, and Claim 1′ which in turn uses Lemmas 3′ and 4′. Since Lemmas 1, 2, 3′, 4′ and 5′ do not require δ to be small, so neither does this proof.
References
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Acknowledgements
We thank the referee for valuable suggestions. We are grateful to Man-Wah Cheung and Ronald A. Edwards for helpful comments. We appreciate helpful comments from participants at the 2007 Australasian Meeting of the Econometric Society. The work described in this paper was substantially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. 4612/05H).
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Appendices
Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 1 for A = 1
1.1 AI.1 Transition among states in \(\bar Z\) when A = 1
1.1.1 AI.1.1 Moving states \(z^{b_n,q_n}\)
When A = 1, the two offer curves OC I and OC II coincides with the diagonal.
Consider any \(n\in\{1,\cdots,\bar n\}\). We now show that:
First, since A = 1, by Eqs. 26, 6, and 19 we have: \( p^-_{I} = p^-_{II}\), and \(p^+_{I} = p^+_{II}\). (This is slightly different from Eq. 27.) Second, from Eq. 26 we still have Eqs. 28 and 29. Third, as \(n\leqq \bar n=\hat n-1=(N/2)-1\) (where N is given in Eq. 7), we have K > 2nδ, and so from Eq. 29 we have \(p^-_I < b_n/q_n\).
Therefore, we need to consider the least number of mutations to achieve \(p^-_I\) and \(p^+_{II}\). We have the minimization problems (MP1) and (MP2) defined in Eqs. 34 and 35, respectively.Footnote 19
Lemma 3′
Let A = 1, then:
-
(a)
The solution of (MP1) is \((\alpha,\beta)=(0,\beta^-_{I})\), where:
$$ \beta^-_I ={(K-b_n)b_n-q_nb_{n-1} \over (\bar q-q_n) b_{n-1 }}. $$(57) -
(b)
The solution of (MP2) is \((\alpha,\beta)=(0,\beta^+_{II})\), where:
$$ \beta^+_{II}={(K-q_n)q_n-b_{n}q_{n+1} \over (K-q_n)(q_n-\underline{q})}. $$(58)
We compare the terms \(\beta^-_I\) and \(\beta^+_{II}\) in the following lemma:
Lemma 4′
Let A = 1. Then:
-
(a)
\(\beta^-_I<\beta^+_{II}\) for all \(n\in\{1,\cdots,\bar n\}\) ,
-
(b)
\(\beta^-_I\) is strictly decreasing in n for all \(n\in\{1,\cdots,\bar n\}\) .
We next focus on \(\beta^-_I\).
Claim 1′
Suppose A = 1.
-
(a)
For any z ∈ Z, if \((1/2)\|z-z^{b_n,q_n}\|<\beta^-_I m\), then Eq. 38 holds.
-
(b)
Let z ∈ Z be such that z(bn − 1) = 1, z(b n ) = m − 1, \(\beta^-_I m\leqq z(\bar q)<\beta^-_I m+1\), and \(z(q_n)=m-z(\bar b)\). Then Eq. 39 holds.
Claim 1′ can be proved in the same manner as Claim 1, and so we omit the proof. Also, Claim 1′ gives similar results as discussed in Remark 3.
1.1.2 AI.1.2 Moving states \(z^{\widetilde b_n,\widetilde q_n}\)
We use the same \(\widetilde p^-_I\), \(\widetilde p^+_I\), \(\widetilde p^-_{II}\) and \(\widetilde p^+_{II}\) given in Section 3.5.4. We focus on \({\widetilde{p}}^-_{II}\) and \({\widetilde{p}}^+_I\), and have the minimization problems (\(\widetilde{{\rm MP}_{1}}\)) and (\(\widetilde {\rm{MP}_2}\)) defined in Eqs. 42 and 43. Then the solutions of (\(\widetilde {\rm{MP}_1}\)) and (\(\widetilde {\rm{MP}_2}\)) are \(({\widetilde{\alpha}}^-_{II},0)\) and \(({\widetilde{\alpha}}^+_I,0)\) respectively, where \({\widetilde{\alpha}}^-_{II}=\beta^-_I\), and \({\widetilde{\alpha}}^+_I=\beta^+_{II}\).
1.1.3 AI.1.3 Least number of mutation for moving state \(z^{\hat b,\hat q}\)
We consider the critical prices \(p^L_I\), \(p^R_I\), \(p^L_{II}\), and \(p^R_{II}\) given in Eq. 45. As A = 1, we have:
We focus on \(p^L_{II}\) and \(p^R_I\), and have minimization problems (MP L ) and (MP R ) given in Eqs. 48 and 49. Their solutions are \((0,\beta^L_{II})\) and \(( \alpha^R_{I},0)\), respectively, and \(\beta^L_{II}=\alpha^R_I\).
Lemma 5′
Let A = 1. Then \(\beta^L_{II}>\beta^-_I|_{n=1}\)
As in Remark 3a, leaving the basin of attraction of \(z^{\hat b,\hat q}\) requires the number of mutations to be at least \(\beta^L_{II}m\) (\(=\alpha^R_Im\)).
1.2 AI.2 Proof of Theorem 1 when A = 1
The main strategy of the proof is almost identical to the one used for the case of A > 1. We will follow the same steps of the proof with some minor modifications.
(Step 1)
-
(Stage A)
When A = 1, the two offer curves OC I and OC II coincide with the diagonal, on which the point \((\hat b,\hat q)\) is in the middle, and the points (b n ,q n ) and \((\widetilde b_n,\widetilde q_n)\) are in the left and right side of it, respectively. Notice that, when A = 1, each (b n ,q n ) satisfies Eq. 23 and each \((\widetilde b_n,\widetilde q_n)\) satisfies Eq. 24 with equalities. Thus, the arguments in Cases A1 through A4 in the proof for the case of A > 1 are still valid.
-
(Stage B)
Now we will modify Cases B1 and B2 as follows:
-
(Case B1′)
Consider the set \(\{(b_n,q_n):n=1,\cdots,\bar n\}\). For each (b n ,q n ), we choose the state z ∈ Z where z(b n − 1) = 1, \(\beta^-_Im\leqq z({\underline{b}})<\beta^-_I m+1\), \(z(b_n)=m-z({\underline{b}})-1\), and z(q n) = m.
We then choose the path \((z^{b_n,q_n}\to z\to z^{b_{n-1},q_n})\). We have \(r(z^{b_n,q_n}\to z\to z^{b_{n-1},q_n})< \beta^-_I+2\) by Claim 1′.
-
(Case B2′)
Consider the set \(\{(\widetilde b_n,\widetilde q_n):n=1,\cdots,\bar n\}\). For each \((\widetilde b_n,\widetilde q_n)\), we choose the state z ∈ Z where \(z(\widetilde q_{n-1})=1\), \(\widetilde\alpha^-_{II}m\leqq z({\underline{q}})<\widetilde\alpha^-_{II}m+1\), \(z(\widetilde q_n)=m-z({\underline{q}})-1\), and \(z(\widetilde b^n)=m\). We then choose the path \((z^{\widetilde b_n,\widetilde q_n}\to z\to z^{\widetilde b_{n },\widetilde q_{n-1}})\). We have \(r(z^{\widetilde b_n,\widetilde q_n}\to z\to z^{\widetilde b_{n },\widetilde q_{n-1}})< \widetilde\alpha^-_{II}+2\) by Claim 1′.
With these two stages, we complete the construction by choosing the edges for transient states as discussed at the end of Step 1 of the previous proof of Theorem 1. Thus, we have constructed a \(\hat z\)-tree, h.
-
(Case B1′)
(Step 2) The resistance of h is
Now, we consider any \(z'\not=z\) and any tree z′-tree, h′. We must leave all monomorphic states, or all except one, which cannot be \(\hat z\). Therefore, we can at most save one of the terms \( \beta^-_I|_{n}\) and \(\widetilde \alpha^-_{II}|_n\). The maximum of these terms is \( \beta^-_I|_{n=1}<\beta^L_{II}\) (by Lemma 5′). Thus, the resistance
Therefore, as \((\beta^L_{II}-\beta^-_I|_{n=1})>0\), for all large m, we have r(h′) > r(h).
Hence state \(\hat z\) is the unique state in C * given in Fact 1. Therefore, we have μ *(z) = 1. This proves Theorem 1 when A = 1.Footnote 20 □
Appendix II: Proof of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1
By symmetry, it suffices to prove Part a.
At z b,q, the price p = b/q > b/A(K − b′) = P I (b, b′). The price p′ of z b,q|b′ is p′ = (b′ + (m − 1)b)/q. Therefore, when m is sufficiently large, we have p′ > p I (b, b′), so U(b′; z b,q|b′) > U(b, z b,q|b′).□
Proof of Lemma 2
By symmetry, it suffices to prove Part a.
Since \(b'\geqq \hat b=AK/(A+1)\), we have \(b'/[A(K-b')]\geqq 1/A\). Then critical price \(P_I(b,b')=b'/[A(K-b)] >b'/[A(K-b')]\geqq 1/A\). Therefore, (b − b′)/P I (b,b′) < A[b − b′]. We can write P I (b, b′) = b/[A(K − b) + (b − b′)/P I (b, b′)], so we have: \(P_I(b,b')>b/[A(K-b')]\geqq b/q\). Hence, for all large m, we have P I (b, b′) > p′ where p′ = (b′ + (m − 1)b)/q. Thus, U(b′; z b, q|b′) > U(b,z b,q|b′).□
Proof of Lemmas 3b and 3′b
We consider any \(A\geqq 1\). By using the constraint equation in Eq. 35, we can express β as a function of α. Then checking the derivative of α + β with respect to α, we find out that (MP2) has the solution where:
Using Eqs. 26, 19, 7 and 8, by calculation we have:
As the r.h.s of Eq. 63 holds, by Eq. 62 the solution of (MP2) has α = 0. Hence, by the constraint (Eq. 35), we obtain the solution \(\beta=\beta^+_{II}\) as given in Lemmas 3b and 3′b for the cases of A > 1 and A = 1 respectively. □
Proof of Lemmas 3a and 3′a
We consider any \(A\geqq 1\). By using Eq. 34, it follows that the solution of (MP1) is such that:
Using Eqs. 26, 19, 7 and 8, by calculation we have:
Suppose A = 1. As K/2 − nδ < K/2 + (n − 1)δ, we have α = 0, so by the constraint in Eq. 34 we have \(\beta=\beta^-_I\) as claimed in Lemma 3′a. (For this proof of Lemma 3′a, we do not require δ to be small.)
Suppose A > 1, we have AK/(1 + A) > K/(1 + A). Therefore, for all small δ we have β = 0. So by the constraint in Eq. 34 we have \(\alpha=\alpha^-_I\), as claimed in Lemma 3a. □
Proof of Lemma 4
We express
where
(Proof of Part a)
Note that:
So \((d[T^-_1-T^-_2]/ d\delta)|_{\delta=0}<(d[T^+_1-T^+_2]/ d\delta)|_{\delta=0}\). Since \((T^-_1-T^-_2)|_{\delta=0}=0=(T^+_1-T^+_2)|_{\delta=0}\) and \(T^-_3|_{\delta=0}=T^+_3|_{\delta=0}\), we have:
Then \(\alpha^-_I<\beta^+_{II}\) for all small δ.
(Proof of Part b)
Note that:
When δ > 0 is sufficiently small, we disregard terms involving δ 2. Then:
Therefore,
The term \([T^-_3-(T_1-T_2)]/(T^-_3)^2 \) converges to \(1/T^-_3>0\) as δ converges to 0. Then we have \((d\alpha^-_I)/ (d n) <0\) for all small δ > 0. Thus, \(\alpha^-_I\) is strictly decreasing in n. □
Proof of Lemma 4′
Since A = 1, we have:
where:
(Proof of Part a)
Clearly, We have: T 1 < T 1′ and T 2 > T 2′, so \(\beta^-_I<\beta^+_{II}\).
(Proof of Part b)
As d T 1/d n < 0 and dT 2/d n > 0, \(\beta^-_I\) is strictly decreasing in n. □
Proof of Lemma 5
Note that by Eqs. 50, 66 and 67, we have:
Therefore,
Since A > 1, we have (AK + 1)/(AK) > 1 > 2 − A, so \((d\beta^L_{II}/ d\delta )|_{\delta=0}> (d \alpha^-_I|_{n=1} / d\delta) |_{\delta=0}\). □
Proof of Lemma 5′
As A = 1, by Eqs. 50 and 73 we have:
Thus, \(\beta^L_{II}> \beta^-_I|_{n=1}\).□
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Kim, C., Wong, KC. Evolution of Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy. J Evol Econ 21, 619–647 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0220-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0220-x