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Natural selection and rational decision: two concepts of optimization

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Abstract

There are two different kinds of optimization: “selection” and “rationality” optimization. Selection optimization characterizes competition in human and nonhuman societies sharing the same market or niche. “Rationality optimization”, on the other hand, characterizes human and nonhuman decision making processes. The two kinds of optimization generate the same result: agents end up behaving efficiently. Nonetheless, we should not downplay the differences between the two kinds of optimization. Otherwise, we would fail to capture the role of rationality in the development of the organism and possibly its implication for evolution.

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Notes

  1. In fact, the extension of natural selection arguments is not limited to economics. A growing number of social scientists are attempting to reformulate their respective disciplines according evolutionary biology. This is especially evident in psychology (Barkow et al. 1992), anthropology (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Betzig et al. 1988), sociology (Machalek 1992; Lopreato and Crippen 1999), and political science (Masters and Gruter 1992). In economics, this “invasion” has gone in diverse directions (Hirshleifer 1982; Anderson et al. 1988; Witt 2003; Hodgson 1993, 2002; Nelson and Winter 1982; Nelson 1995; passim Koslowski 1999). On the other hand, a few thinkers even aspire to ground the first principles of biology on cost-benefit analysis (Ghiselin 1974, 1992; Tullock 1994). And they are not alone. The study of animal behavior, such as the behavior of specific social insects, is based greatly on how agents exchange information and adjust behavior in light of costs and benefits (e.g., Detrain et al. 1999; Franks et al. 2003; Cassill 2003). It can even be concluded that the aspiration of a general theory of behavior is not unreasonable (see Knudsen 2002).

  2. We ignore here many of the nuances of the term “fitness.” In particular, we ignore the issue of actual fitness as opposed to expected fitness (see Endler 1986, pp. 27–51). Such details are unrelated to our main argument. It should also be noted that there is a slight ambiguity in the literature concerning the definition of fitness for sexually reproducing organisms (Keller 1987). The measure of fitness in terms of the quantity of individuals born with the robust type differs from the number of individuals to which each fit agent gives birth for the simple reason that it takes two agents to replicate in sexual reproduction. Furthermore, a more important problem, which is overlooked here, is that natural selection in a sexually reproducing population may not necessarily engender fitness (Akin 1979; Karlin and Lessard 1986). The selected differences at the phenotypic level may not be transmitted to the next generation because of the random reshuffling of genes, which is responsible for the probabilistic character of Mendelian inheritance.

  3. As mentioned below, Sober (1998) also highlights the difference between the two kinds of optimization. Sober, though, discusses a third criterion, besides the two mentioned in the text, which sets rationality optimization apart from selection optimization. Mindless organisms supposedly do not have subjective utility, but they still have the objective property of fitness. However, as shown earlier, utility optimization, which is used to characterize human decision making, parallels foraging optimization; and market selection parallels natural selection. Thus, although utility can be maximized by agents using anything that they regard as conducive to their welfare, utility itself is still an objective property. Thus, Sober’s third distinction is unwarranted.

  4. In the sense used here, selection should be distinguished from the account of the rise of conventions or standards which are usually welfare- or fitness-neutral vis-à-vis the environment. The stability of conventions – such as using the metric system or particular facial expressions to express disapproval – depends on what other members of the group are doing (Young 1996). In biology, the theory of “evolutionarily stable strategy” (ESS) and evolutionary game theories provide, inter alia, an account of conventions (Maynard Smith 1978a, b, 1982; Vincent and Brown 1988; Hammerstein and Selten 1994). A strategy is found to be ESS if all members in the pertinent population adopt it, which makes the group immune from the invasion of other competing strategies. In contrast, the stability characterizing the fitness of a population in relation to its environment is a substantive property, i.e., not conditioned on the unison of actions of members. This paper is concerned exclusively with substantive properties which are usually welfare- or fitness-sensitive vis-à-vis the environment.

  5. There are biological theories of altruism other than the inclusive fitness hypothesis. For instance, some authors have explained altruism as the product of selfish agents involved in an iterative game of cooperation (Trivers 1971, 1974). Other authors have explained altruism as being sustainable within a group selection framework (Sober and Wilson 1999). It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss altruism in general (see Khalil 2001, 2004). In any case, although beyond the scope of this paper, these alternative theories of altruism should also prove to be part of the rationality optimization approach.

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Acknowledgements

This paper includes parts from a working paper, “Charles Darwin Meets Organismus economicus,” issued by the Evolutionary Economics Group (#2006–22), Max Planck Institute of Economics. This paper was supported by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (Altenberg, Austria), the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena, Germany), and Monash University’s Faculty Research Grant Scheme, 2006. A much older version received comments from Richard Posner, Ulrich Witt, Gerhard Müller, Werner Callebaut, Steven Orzack, Steve Abedon, Jack Vromen, Brian Charlesworth, Gordon Tullock, Timothy Crippen, Michael Ghiselin, Howard Margolis, Robert Axelrod, Richard Levins, Richard Nelson, Joseph Lopreato, R Preston McAfee, JS Metcalfe, Peter Taylor, Elliott Sober, Stanley Salthe, Casey Mulligan, Franz Weissing, and participants of seminars at the Konrad Lorenz Institute and Monash University. The current version received comments from Brian Skyrms, Jack Vromen, Michael Ghiselin, Yew-Kwang Ng, Richard Posner, Paul Griffiths, Ulrich Witt, Avi Waksberg, Martin Burd, Ellen Larsen, and Deby Cassill. The paper benefited greatly from the assistance of Michael Dunstan. The usual caveat applies.

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    Elias L. Khalil

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Khalil, E.L. Natural selection and rational decision: two concepts of optimization. J Evol Econ 19, 417–435 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0120-x

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