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Walras and Darwin: an odd couple?

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Abstract

General equilibrium theory and the evolutionary branches of economics and game theory take rather opposite positions in the spectrum covered by the economic science. However, we reveal and explore analogies between Darwinian dynamics and Walrasian tâtonnement processes for pure exchange economies, as well as further analogies implied by these.

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  1. School of Business, Public Administration and Technology, University of Twente, POB 217, 7500 AE, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Reinoud Joosten

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  1. Reinoud Joosten
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Correspondence to Reinoud Joosten.

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Joosten, R. Walras and Darwin: an odd couple?. J Evol Econ 16, 561–573 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-006-0037-1

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