Journal of Evolutionary Economics

, Volume 15, Issue 4, pp 443–465 | Cite as

Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation

  • Luca LambertiniEmail author


I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.


Differential games Time consistency Investment Optimal control methods Stackelberg equilibrium 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dipartimento di Scienze EconomicheUniversitá di BolognaBolognaItaly
  2. 2.ENCORE, Faculty of Economics & EconometricsUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations