Abstract
Empirical research has consistently shown that, on average, men are paid higher wages than women. Moreover, men enjoy more leisure time than women. We develop a noncooperative model of the private provision of family public goods to analyze whether the wage gap and the leisure gap are related. Simultaneous and sequential decision-making structures within a couple lead to different empirical hypotheses. Our estimates based on the German Socio-Economic Panel data show that husbands enjoy, other things equal, more leisure time than their wives. This advantage can be explained if the husband is the Stackelberg leader in a sequential private provision game.
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Beblo, M., Robledo, J.R. The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples. J Popul Econ 21, 281–304 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0132-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0132-5