Abstract
To date, many arguments to explain altruistic behavior were based on `kin selection'. This note shows that evolution can sustain altruism even if the players are not necessarily genetically linked. Depending on the payoff parameters in a prisoner's dilemma game, there can be four distinct types of equilibria, for each of them the proportion of altruists in the population is described.
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The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for valuable comments.
Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.
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Kahana, N. On the surge of altruism. J Popul Econ 18, 261–266 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-005-0230-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-005-0230-9