Reusable Fuzzy Extractors for Low-Entropy Distributions

Abstract

Fuzzy extractors (Dodis et al., in Advances in cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2014, Springer, Berlin, 2014, pp 93–110) convert repeated noisy readings of a secret into the same uniformly distributed key. To eliminate noise, they require an initial enrollment phase that takes the first noisy reading of the secret and produces a nonsecret helper string to be used in subsequent readings. Reusable fuzzy extractors (Boyen, in Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on computer and communications security, CCS, ACM, New York, 2004, pp 82–91) remain secure even when this initial enrollment phase is repeated multiple times with noisy versions of the same secret, producing multiple helper strings (for example, when a single person’s biometric is enrolled with multiple unrelated organizations). We construct the first reusable fuzzy extractor that makes no assumptions about how multiple readings of the source are correlated. The extractor works for binary strings with Hamming noise; it achieves computational security under the existence of digital lockers (Canetti and Dakdouk, in Advances in cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2008, Springer, Berlin, 2008, pp 489–508). It is simple and tolerates near-linear error rates. Our reusable extractor is secure for source distributions of linear min-entropy rate. The construction is also secure for sources with much lower entropy rates—lower than those supported by prior (nonreusable) constructions—assuming that the distribution has some additional structure, namely, that random subsequences of the source have sufficient minentropy. Structure beyond entropy is necessary to support distributions with low entropy rates. We then explore further how different structural properties of a noisy source can be used to construct fuzzy extractors when the error rates are high, building a computationally secure and an information-theoretically secure construction for large-alphabet sources.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Robust fuzzy extractors [10, 17, 24, 49, 54] additionally protect against active attackers who modify p. Our constructions can be made robust by the random-oracle-based transform of [10, Theorem 1]. We discuss robustness further in Sect. 3.

  2. 2.

    The term “digital lockers” was introduced by Canetti and Dakdouk [16]; the fact that such digital lockers can be built easily out cryptographic hash functions is shown by [47, Section 4].

  3. 3.

    The entropy rate of a string is the entropy divided by the length of the string.

  4. 4.

    We use \(\log \) to denote \(\log _2\). We use \(\ln \) to denote the natural logarithm.

  5. 5.

    The error rate of a string is the number of errors divided by the length of the string.

  6. 6.

    See [3, Lemma 4.7.2, Equation 4.7.5, p. 115] for one characterization on the size of Hamming balls in the binary field.

  7. 7.

    Binary entropy \(h_2(\alpha )\) for \(0<\alpha <1\) is defined as \(-\alpha \log \alpha -(1-\alpha ) \log (1-\alpha )\); it is greater than \(\alpha \log \frac{1}{\alpha }\) and, in particular, greater than \(\alpha \) for interesting range \(\alpha <\frac{1}{2}\).

  8. 8.

    However, standard heuristics for estimating entropy can also be used to indicate whether a source has high-entropy samples. For a corpus of noisy signals, repeat the following a statistically significant number of times: (1) sample k indices (2) run the heuristic entropy test on the corpus which each sample restricted to the k indices, (3) for estimates \({est}_1,\dots , {est}_m\) compute the average min entropy, as defined in Sect. 2, of these estimates by \(-\log \sum _i 2^{-{est}_i}\).

  9. 9.

    Reusability and unlinkability are two different properties. Unlinkability prevents an adversary from telling if two enrollments correspond to the same physical source [21, 42]. We do not consider this property in this work.

  10. 10.

    We present and analyze the construction with uniformly random subsets; however, if necessary, it is possible to substantially decrease the required public randomness and the length of p by using more sophisticated samplers. See [35] for an introduction to samplers. Security does not depend on the subsets being independently random. It is sufficient for the marginal distribution of each subset to be random. The subsets being distinct (and independent) is used to argue correctness.

  11. 11.

    For the construction to be reusable \(\rho \) times the digital locker must be composable \(\ell \cdot \rho \) times.

  12. 12.

    Any code that corrects \(t\) Hamming errors also corrects \(t\) \(0\rightarrow 1\) errors, but more efficient codes exist for this type of error [62]. Codes with \(2^{\Theta (n)}\) codewords and \(t= \Theta (n)\) over the binary alphabet exist for Hamming errors and suffice for our purposes (first constructed by Justensen [41]). These codes also yield a constant error tolerance for \(0\rightarrow 1\) bit flips. The class of errors we support in our source (\(t\) Hamming errors over a large alphabet) and the class of errors for which we need codes (\(t\) \(0\rightarrow 1\) errors) are different.

  13. 13.

    Here we assume that \(|\mathcal {Z}|\ge n\times \log p\), that is the source has a small number of symbols.

  14. 14.

    We actually need \(({\mathsf {Gen}} ', {\mathsf {Rep}} ')\) to be an average case fuzzy extractor (see [26, Definition 4] and the accompanying discussion). Most known constructions of fuzzy extractors are average-case fuzzy extractors. For simplicity we refer to \({\mathsf {Gen}} ', {\mathsf {Rep}} '\) as simply a fuzzy extractor.

  15. 15.

    Note, again, that \(({\mathsf {Gen}} ', {\mathsf {Rep}} ')\) must be an average-case fuzzy extractor. Most known constructions are average-case and we omit this notation.

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Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Nishanth Chandran, Nir Bitansky, Sharon Goldberg, Gene Itkis, Bhavana Kanukurthi, and Mayank Varia for helpful discussions, creative ideas, and important references. Adam Smith performed this work while on the faculty of the Pennsylvania State University’s Department of Computer Science and Engineering. The research was partly supported by NSF awards 0747294 and 0941553. Part of the research was done while A.S. was on sabbatical, supported by Boston University’s Hariri Institute for Computing. Ran Canetti is supported by the NSF MACS project, an NSF Algorithmic Foundations Grant 1218461, the Check Point Institute for Information Security, and ISF Grant 1523/14. Omer Paneth is additionally supported by the Simons award for graduate students in theoretical computer science. Benjamin Fuller performed this work while at Boston University and MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The work of Benjamin Fuller was sponsored in part by US NSF Grants 1012910, 1012798, and 1849904 and the United States Air Force under Air Force Contract FA8721-05-C-0002. Opinions, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Government. Leonid Reyzin is supported in part by US NSF Grants 0831281, 1012910, 1012798, and 1422965.

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© IACR 2020. This article is the final version submitted by the author(s) to the IACR and to Springer-Verlag on September 15, 2020. A preliminary version of this work appeared at the 35th IACR Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT, May 2016. Differences between that work and this manuscript are discussed at the end of the introduction.

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Canetti, R., Fuller, B., Paneth, O. et al. Reusable Fuzzy Extractors for Low-Entropy Distributions. J Cryptol 34, 2 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-020-09367-8

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Keywords

  • Fuzzy extractors
  • Reusability
  • Key derivation
  • Digital lockers
  • Point obfuscation