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Economic Theory

, Volume 18, Issue 3, pp 661–681 | Cite as

Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

  • Esther Hauk
  • Sjaak Hurkens
Research Article

Summary.

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.

Keywords and Phrases:Information acquisition, Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Bayesian equilibrium. 
JEL Classification Numbers:C72, D43, D82. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Esther Hauk
    • 1
  • Sjaak Hurkens
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25–27, 08005 Barcelona, SPAIN (e-mail: esther.hauk@econ.upf.es) ES

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