Economic Theory

, Volume 18, Issue 2, pp 485–509 | Cite as

Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

  • Guangsug Hahn
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
Symposium Articles


A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.

Keywords and Phrases: Implementation, Differential information, Cooperative games, Incentive compatibility, Interim private core, Interim private value. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C71, D51, D78, D82. 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guangsug Hahn
    • 1
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
    • 2
  1. 1.Korea Economic Research Institute, Seoul, 150-756 KOREA (e-mail: KR
  2. 2.Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,Champaign, IL 61820, USA (e-mail: US

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