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Economic Theory

, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp 675–692 | Cite as

Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

  • Bettina Klaus
Research Articles

Abstract.

We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. We consider rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonicity. We show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. We also provide characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonicity. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, we can interpret the characterizations as impossibility results.

Keywords and Phrases: Strategy-proofness, Serial-dictatorship, Population-monotonicity, Separability, Non-bossiness. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D71. 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bettina Klaus
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA (e-mail: bklaus1@unl.edu) US

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