Büchner’s Danton and the Metaphysics of Atheism

  • Rodney Taylor


Disillusionment and despair represent the subjective corollaries of Damon’s revolutionary actions. In the face of his impending death he describes himself as an atheist. This self-characterization relates to a complex metaphysical conception of the universe by means of which Danton articulates the depth and magnitude of his suffering.


Desillusionierung und Verzweiflung ergeben sich für Danton folgerichtig aus seinen revolutionären Taten. Vor seinem nahen Tode bezeichnet er sich als Atheisten. Dieses Selbstverständnis gründet in einer komplexen metaphysischen Weltauffassung, mittels derer Danton die Tiefe seines Elends zum Ausdruck bringt.


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  1. 1.
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Copyright information

© Metzler 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rodney Taylor
    • 1
  1. 1.KirksvilleUSA

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