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Investitionsanreize, Koalitionsverhalten und Gläubigerkonflikte

  • Jochen Bigus
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Summary

The article focuses on conflicts of interest between senior and junior debt. When the senior creditor faces a default risk and a coalition among the entrepreneur and the senior creditor is possible, the may jointly choose a less risky, but inefficient investment policy, at the cost of the remaining creditor. The junior creditor may anticipate this problem and rations credit then. Projects with a positive net present value may not be undertaken (underinvestment). If the junior creditor can seize some private wealth from the entrepreneur (external collateral), the problems is mitigated. The coalition problems depends on the type of senior and junior debt. When there is a me-first-rule or when there is unsecured and subordinated debt with even lower priority, coalition problems may be more severe than in the case of secured and unsecured debt. Note however, that there also may be a coalition’s incentive to decrease risk when priority is due to the maturity rather than to the rank of claims.

JEL-Classification

G31 G32 

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Copyright information

© Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft.eV. 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jochen Bigus
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduiertenkolleg Recht und ÖkonomikUniversität HamburgHamburgDeutschland

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