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Business Research

, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 8–32 | Cite as

Hanging Together, Together Hung? Career Implications of Interpersonal Ties Between CEOs and Top Managers

  • Stefan Hilger
  • Ansgar Richter
  • Utz Schäffer
Open Access
Article

Abstract

Is it good or bad for senior executives to have strong interpersonal ties to the CEO? We argue that a strong relationship with the CEO raises the likelihood that a top manager stays in office or makes an upward career move when the CEO leaves office voluntarily. At the same time, such interpersonal ties also reinforce the negative spillover effects of a dismissal of the CEO on the career prospects of the manager concerned. Our empirical analysis lends support to both arguments. We contribute to managerial succession research by underlining the ambivalence of interpersonal ties within top management teams.

JEL classification

D85 M51 G30 

Keywords

interpersonal ties top executive careers top executive turnover top management teams 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Strategy, Organization & LeadershipEBS Business SchoolGermany
  2. 2.Institute of Management Accounting and ControlWHU — Otto Beisheim School of ManagementGermany

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