Public Choice

, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 97–113 | Cite as

A collective goods model of pluralist political systems

  • John R. Chamberlin


Group Size Public Choice Group Behavior Collective Good Reaction Curve 
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Copyright information

© Springer 1978

Authors and Affiliations

  • John R. Chamberlin
    • 1
  1. 1.The Institute of Public Policy StudiesThe University of MichiganUSA

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