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A psycho-logic of motion

  • Jon Ogborn
  • Joan Bliss
Article

Abstract

In this paper we set out a theoretical account of how we suppose commonsense reasoning about motion may develop. We identify some of the most primitive building blocks necessary to the construction of a psycho-logic of motion. Our analysis shows how such primitive elements could combine together to provide schemes of motion, recognisable in psychological accounts of infancy, which themselves generate both prototypes of and rules for motion used in commonsense reasoning. The theory takes as fundamental the basic (essentially Kantian) categories of commonsense reasoning: action, object, space, cause, time and movement. We also start with Piaget’s intuition that action and movement are primitive and fundamental to all development. A number of levels are suggested from the initial primitive schemes, emerging rules and prototypes, new prototypes from combinations, projection of prototypes onto other objects and elaboration. Examples are given of prototypes which are the link between the deep seated ways of thinking and commonsense reasoning.

Key words

Motion Cognitive development Commonsense theory 

Hypothèses sur la psycho-genèse des conceptions „naturelles” du mouvement

Résumé

Cet article développe un cadre théorique permettant de rendre compte du développement des conceptions „naturelles” du mouvement. Les premiers éléments nécessaires á l’appréhension du mouvement sont identifiés. L’analyse montre que la combinaison de ces éléments primitifs peuvent se combiner et aboutir à des schèmes de mouvement chez l’enfant; ces schèmes générent des prototypes de mouvement et des règles que l’on retrouve dans le raisonnement du sens commun. La théorie s’appuie sur les catégories du sens commun, essentiellement kantiennes (action, objet, espace, cause, temps et déplacement) et sur l’intuition piagétienne selon laquelle l’action et le déplacement sont à la base du développement. Un certain nombre de niveaux sont envisagés, partant des schèmes primitifs, à partir desquels émergent des règles et des prototypes qui à leur tour permettront l’émergence d’autres objects. Des exemples de prototypes sont donnés qui permettent de faire le lien entre les formes de pensée les plus précoces et le raisonnement du sens commun.

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Copyright information

© Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisbon, Portugal/ Springer Netherlands 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jon Ogborn
    • 2
  • Joan Bliss
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Educational Studies, King’s College LondonUniversity of LondonLondon
  2. 2.Institute of EducationLondon

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