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References
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I am grateful for comments by participants in the conference, organised by the European Association for Law and Economics and the Geneva Association, in Geneva, April 1986. The paper has also benefited from the detailed suggestions made by a referee and by Carol Fethke. The first version of the paper was written before the appearance of Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) which tackles the same general issues but in a way which leads to somewhat different conclusions. The papers are complementary and are compared in section IV.
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Gravelle, H.S.E. Insurance and corrective taxes in the health care market. J Econ 46 (Suppl 1), 99–120 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03051788
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03051788