Journal of Economics

, Volume 46, Supplement 1, pp 99–120 | Cite as

Insurance and corrective taxes in the health care market

  • H. S. E. Gravelle


Demand Function Moral Hazard Substitution Effect Insurance Contract Pareto Improvement 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. S. E. Gravelle
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsQueen Mary CollegeLondonUK

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