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Evolutionary processes and networks

PROCESSUS D’ÉVOLUTION ET RÉSEAUX

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Abstract

The paper deals with coevolution of different networks: it provides an approach based on evolutionary game theory. It examines the impact of learning and experimentation processes. It firstly yields results in a context where each agent directly interacts with all the other agents. Then it contrasts these results with the ones obtained when everybody only cares about the actions played by the agents in the neighborhood.

Résumé

Ľarticle approche la coévolution de différents réseaux par la théorie des jeux évolutionnistes. Il examine ľimpact de processus ďapprentissage et ď expérimentation. Ľétude, dans un premier temps, est restreinte aux contextes oú chaque agent est en interaction avec ľensemble des agents économiques. Elle compare ensuite les résultats ainsi obtenus aux résultats qui découlent ďune confrontation limitée, où chaque acteur n’interagii qu’avec les agents situés dans son voisinage.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bureau ďéconomie théorique et appliquée, 38, boulevard ďAnvers, F-67070, Strasbourg Cedex, France

    Giséle Umbhauer

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  1. Giséle Umbhauer
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Ce travail a bénéficié ďun soutien de France Télécom (cnet et dps).

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Umbhauer, G. Evolutionary processes and networks. Ann. Télécommun. 50, 205–216 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02999994

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02999994

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