Property rights to married women’s earnings: A topic in Jewish law
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The paper examines a passage in the Talmud regarding the attitude of Jewish Law toward the earnings of a married women. Considering a wife and her husband as two consumers who have preferences over income and “good feelings,” it analyzes a controversy in the Gemara over the distribution of the wife's earnings. Using economic tools the paper shows that a rule enabling the wife to trade her earnings only in terms of “all or nothing” actually imposes a Pareto-optimal allocation within the family, one that is unlikely to resuh from a negotiated agreement.
KeywordsMarried Woman Indifference Curve Contemporary JEWRY Optional Contract Good Feeling
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