Abstract
The paper examines a passage in the Talmud regarding the attitude of Jewish Law toward the earnings of a married women. Considering a wife and her husband as two consumers who have preferences over income and “good feelings,” it analyzes a controversy in the Gemara over the distribution of the wife's earnings. Using economic tools the paper shows that a rule enabling the wife to trade her earnings only in terms of “all or nothing” actually imposes a Pareto-optimal allocation within the family, one that is unlikely to resuh from a negotiated agreement.
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The authors are grateful to C. Chiswick, R. Geffen and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.
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Hollander, G., Kahana, N. & Lecker, T. Property rights to married women’s earnings: A topic in Jewish law. Cont Jewry 20, 57–67 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02967959
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02967959