“If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say ‘God is’, or ‘There is a God’, we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being anobject which stands in relation to my concept. The content of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept … by my thinking its object (through the expression ‘it is’) as given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible.” Kant: Critique of Pure Reason A. 599 B.627.
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Cf. my note “Necessary Being” A.J.P. Vol. 35 No. 3 December, 1957 at p. 205.
Though I have offered a ‘justification’ of causality in my note ‘Necessary Being’ cited above, cf. A.J.P. Vol. 35 No. 3 December, 1957 pp. 203–204.
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Hutchigns, P.Æ. God and existence. SOPH 2, 1–10 (1963). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02934129
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02934129