Advertisement

Intereconomics

, Volume 37, Issue 5, pp 253–262 | Cite as

A legally binding EU charter of fundamental rights?

  • Lothar Funk
Articles Social Cohesion

Abstract

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is based, on the one hand, on the traditional concept that fundamental rights are a means to protect citizens against unjustified interference by public authorities. On the other hand, by contrast to the general defensive approach of negative rights, and more controversially, some chapters guarantee quite extensive positive rights to protection and entitlements, based on equality and solidarity. The following article offers an economic analysis of the efficiency and legitimacy of the Charter, including the question of whether it should be binding at a supranational level.

Keywords

Monetary Policy Social Cohesion Supranational Level Constitutional Treaty Constitutional Political Economy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    J. Janning: A Europe without borders. Policies of managing change 2001, International Bertelsmann Forum, Gütersioh 2001, Bertelsmann, pp. 6–8.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    C. McCrudden: The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/01, New York 2001, p. 10.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Ibid., C. McCrudden: The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/01, New York 2001, p. 16. see T. von Danwitz: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in: Internationale Politik—Transatlantic Edition, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001, pp. 23–27, here p. 26.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    A. Diamantopoulou: The European social model: promoting economic and social progress, address to the international conference on achieving balanced economic and social growth, 19 March 2001.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    For a graphical description see P. Pochet: The new European Social Agenda 2001–2006, in C. Degryse, P. Pochet, (eds.): Social developments in the European Union, Brussels 2001, ETUI, pp. 37–51, here p. 41.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Commission of the European Communities: Social Policy Agenda. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 28 June 2000, Brussels, p. 6.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    J.T. Addison, W.S. Siebert: Regulating European lab]cur markets: more costs than benefits, London 1999, Institute for Economic Affairs.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Employers attack charter for temps as unworkab]le, in: The Guardian, 21 March 2002.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    B. Neuss: Europe's Constitutional Convention, in: Internationale Politik—Transatlantic Edition, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2002, pp. 13–18, here p. 14.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    See on this A. Alesina, I. Angeloni, L. Schuknecht: What does the Euroean Union do?, Harvard University Working Paper, Boston 2002; and G. Tab]ellini: Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: an Economic Perspective, Bocconi University Working Paper, Milan 2002.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    A. Wiener: The constitutional significance of the charter of fundamental rights, in: German Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 18, 2001, pp. 1–9, here p. 7.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    According to U. Roth and V. Thomas: Europe on the path to a common social policy, Inter Nationes Basis-Info, No. 34, 2000, p. 13, Quoted from N. Barry: Competitive federalism: the case of the European Union, Brussels 2001, The Centre for the New Europe, p. 9.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    S. Deakin: Social rights and the market, in: U. Mückenberger (ed.): Manifesto Social Europe, Brussels 2001, ETUI, pp. 17–40, here pp. 33–35.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    S. Voigt: What constitution for Europe? The constitutional question from the point of view of (positive) constitutional economics, in: T. Bruha, J.J. Hesse, C. Nowak (eds.). Welche Verfassung für Europa?, Berlin 2001, Springer, pp. 41–61, here p. 49.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    M. Höreth: The European Commission's White Paper on Governance: A “Tool-Kit” for closing the legitimacy gap of EU policy-making?, Center for European Integration Studies Discussion Paper 94, Bonn 2001, p. 22.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    B. Kohler-Koch: The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Govermance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, pp. 12–13.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    D. Miliband: Perspectives on European Integration—A British View, Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies Working Paper 02/02, Cologne 2002, p. 2.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    B. Kohler-Koch, op. cit. The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Governance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, p. 12.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Ibid., B. Kohler-Koch: The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Governance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, p. 13.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    M. C. Munger: Analyzing Policy. Choices, Conflicts and Practices, New York, London 2000, W.W. Norton, p. 358.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Centre for Economic Policy Research: Social Europe, London 2000, p. 2.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    D. Miliband, op. cit., Perspectives on European Integration—A British View, Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies Working Paper 02/02, Cologne 2002, p. 5.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    R. Schobben: “New Governance” in the European Union: A Cross-Disciplinary Comparison, in: Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 35–61, here pp. 38–39; D. Soskice, B. Hancké, G. Trumbull, A. Wren: Wage Bargaining, Lab]our Markets and Macroeconomic Performance in Germany and the Netherlands, in: L. Delsen, E. de Jong (eds.): The German and Dutch Economies. Who Follows Whom?, Heidelberg 1998, pp. 39–51, here p. 42.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    A. Turner: Just Capital. The Liberal Economy, London 2001, Macmillan, pp. 107–164.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    D. Soskice et al., pp. 50–1; and L. Funk: The “Storm before the Calm” thesis Re-examined, in: J. Leonhard, L. Funk (eds.): Ten years of German unification: transfer, transformation, incorporation?, Birmingham 2002, Birmingham University Press, pp. 183–210, here p. 183.Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    J.T. Addison: Is community social policy beneficial, irrelevant, or harmful to the lab]our market performance of the European Union?, University of Potsdam Discussion Paper 90, Potsdam 2000, p. 7.Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    H. Siebert: The Assignment Problem, in S. K. Berninghaus, M. Braulke (eds.): Beiträge zur Mikro- und Makroökonomik, Berlin 2001, Springer, pp. 439–448, here p. 444.Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    J.T. Addison, op. cit., Is community social policy beneficial, irrelevant, or harmful to the lab]our market performance of the European Union?, University of Potsdam Discussion Paper 90, Potsdam 2000, p. 10.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    D. Miliband, op. cit., Perspectives on European Integration—A British View, Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies Working Paper 02/02, Cologne 2002, pp. 22–23.Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    H. Grab]be: Translating Ireland, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 4 July 2001, p. 8.Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    N. Barry, op. cit.,, pp. 13–17.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    B. Kohler-Koch, op. cit., The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Governance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, p. 8.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    R. Mudambi, P. Navarra, G. Sobbrio: Constitutional Issues in Modern Democracies, in: R. Mudambi, P. Navarra, G. Sobbrio: Rules and Reason, Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge 2001, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–5, here p. 1.Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Ibid.,, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Ibid.,, p. 3.Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    D.C. Mueller: On Writing a Constitution, in: R. Mudambi et al., op. cit.,, here pp. 23–27, R. Vaubel: Der Hochmut der Institutionen, in: Rheinischer Merkur, 1 March 2002, p. 8.Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    D.C. Mueller, op. cit.,, pp. 24 and 26.Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    R. Vaubel: Der Hochmut der institutionen, op. cit., in: Rheinischer Merkur, 1 March 2002, p. 8; R. Vaubel: Europa-Chauvinismus. Der Hochmut der Institutionen, Munich 2001, Universitas, pp. 126–134 and 190–200.Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    A. Wiener, op. cit., The constitutional significance of the charter of fundamental rights, in: German Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 18, 2001, p. 9.Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    R. Vaubel, op. cit., Europa-Chauvinismus. Der Hochmut der Institutionen, Munich 2001, Universitas, p. 8.Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    K. Hughes: Is this Europe's Philadelphia?, in: Wall Street Journal Europe, 28 February 2001, p. 7.Google Scholar
  42. 42.
    H.-E. Scharrer: Single market or National Industrial Policies?, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2002, pp. 66–67, here p. 66.Google Scholar
  43. 43.
    The Wall Street Journal Europe: A good constitution, 28 February 2002, p. 6.Google Scholar
  44. 44.
    A. Wiener, op. cit., The constitutional significance of the charter of fundamental rights, in: German Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 18, 2001, p. 7.Google Scholar
  45. 45.
    H. Wallace: Experiments in European governance, in: M. Jachtenfuchs, M. Knodt (eds.): Regieren in internationalen Institutionen, Opladen 2002, Leske and Budrich, pp. 255–269, here p. 255.Google Scholar
  46. 46.
    F. W. Scharpf: European governance: common concerns vs the challenge of diversity, in: M. Jachtenfuchs, M. Knodt (eds.): Regieren in internationalen Institutionen, Opladen 2002, Leske and Budrich, pp 271–284, here p. 276.Google Scholar
  47. 47.
    H. Wallace, op. cit.,, pp. 266–267.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© HWWA and Springer-Verlag 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lothar Funk

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations