Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A legally binding EU charter of fundamental rights?

  • Articles
  • Social Cohesion
  • Published:
Intereconomics

Abstract

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is based, on the one hand, on the traditional concept that fundamental rights are a means to protect citizens against unjustified interference by public authorities. On the other hand, by contrast to the general defensive approach of negative rights, and more controversially, some chapters guarantee quite extensive positive rights to protection and entitlements, based on equality and solidarity. The following article offers an economic analysis of the efficiency and legitimacy of the Charter, including the question of whether it should be binding at a supranational level.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. J. Janning: A Europe without borders. Policies of managing change 2001, International Bertelsmann Forum, Gütersioh 2001, Bertelsmann, pp. 6–8.

  2. C. McCrudden: The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/01, New York 2001, p. 10.

  3. Ibid., C. McCrudden: The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/01, New York 2001, p. 16. see T. von Danwitz: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in: Internationale Politik—Transatlantic Edition, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001, pp. 23–27, here p. 26.

  4. A. Diamantopoulou: The European social model: promoting economic and social progress, address to the international conference on achieving balanced economic and social growth, 19 March 2001.

  5. For a graphical description see P. Pochet: The new European Social Agenda 2001–2006, in C. Degryse, P. Pochet, (eds.): Social developments in the European Union, Brussels 2001, ETUI, pp. 37–51, here p. 41.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Commission of the European Communities: Social Policy Agenda. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 28 June 2000, Brussels, p. 6.

  7. J.T. Addison, W.S. Siebert: Regulating European lab]cur markets: more costs than benefits, London 1999, Institute for Economic Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Employers attack charter for temps as unworkab]le, in: The Guardian, 21 March 2002.

  9. B. Neuss: Europe's Constitutional Convention, in: Internationale Politik—Transatlantic Edition, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2002, pp. 13–18, here p. 14.

  10. See on this A. Alesina, I. Angeloni, L. Schuknecht: What does the Euroean Union do?, Harvard University Working Paper, Boston 2002; and G. Tab]ellini: Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: an Economic Perspective, Bocconi University Working Paper, Milan 2002.

  11. A. Wiener: The constitutional significance of the charter of fundamental rights, in: German Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 18, 2001, pp. 1–9, here p. 7.

  12. According to U. Roth and V. Thomas: Europe on the path to a common social policy, Inter Nationes Basis-Info, No. 34, 2000, p. 13, Quoted from N. Barry: Competitive federalism: the case of the European Union, Brussels 2001, The Centre for the New Europe, p. 9.

    Google Scholar 

  13. S. Deakin: Social rights and the market, in: U. Mückenberger (ed.): Manifesto Social Europe, Brussels 2001, ETUI, pp. 17–40, here pp. 33–35.

    Google Scholar 

  14. S. Voigt: What constitution for Europe? The constitutional question from the point of view of (positive) constitutional economics, in: T. Bruha, J.J. Hesse, C. Nowak (eds.). Welche Verfassung für Europa?, Berlin 2001, Springer, pp. 41–61, here p. 49.

    Google Scholar 

  15. M. Höreth: The European Commission's White Paper on Governance: A “Tool-Kit” for closing the legitimacy gap of EU policy-making?, Center for European Integration Studies Discussion Paper 94, Bonn 2001, p. 22.

  16. B. Kohler-Koch: The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Govermance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, pp. 12–13.

  17. D. Miliband: Perspectives on European Integration—A British View, Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies Working Paper 02/02, Cologne 2002, p. 2.

  18. B. Kohler-Koch, op. cit. The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Governance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, p. 12.

  19. Ibid., B. Kohler-Koch: The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Governance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, p. 13.

  20. M. C. Munger: Analyzing Policy. Choices, Conflicts and Practices, New York, London 2000, W.W. Norton, p. 358.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Centre for Economic Policy Research: Social Europe, London 2000, p. 2.

  22. D. Miliband, op. cit., Perspectives on European Integration—A British View, Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies Working Paper 02/02, Cologne 2002, p. 5.

  23. R. Schobben: “New Governance” in the European Union: A Cross-Disciplinary Comparison, in: Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 35–61, here pp. 38–39; D. Soskice, B. Hancké, G. Trumbull, A. Wren: Wage Bargaining, Lab]our Markets and Macroeconomic Performance in Germany and the Netherlands, in: L. Delsen, E. de Jong (eds.): The German and Dutch Economies. Who Follows Whom?, Heidelberg 1998, pp. 39–51, here p. 42.

  24. A. Turner: Just Capital. The Liberal Economy, London 2001, Macmillan, pp. 107–164.

  25. D. Soskice et al., pp. 50–1; and L. Funk: The “Storm before the Calm” thesis Re-examined, in: J. Leonhard, L. Funk (eds.): Ten years of German unification: transfer, transformation, incorporation?, Birmingham 2002, Birmingham University Press, pp. 183–210, here p. 183.

  26. J.T. Addison: Is community social policy beneficial, irrelevant, or harmful to the lab]our market performance of the European Union?, University of Potsdam Discussion Paper 90, Potsdam 2000, p. 7.

  27. H. Siebert: The Assignment Problem, in S. K. Berninghaus, M. Braulke (eds.): Beiträge zur Mikro- und Makroökonomik, Berlin 2001, Springer, pp. 439–448, here p. 444.

    Google Scholar 

  28. J.T. Addison, op. cit., Is community social policy beneficial, irrelevant, or harmful to the lab]our market performance of the European Union?, University of Potsdam Discussion Paper 90, Potsdam 2000, p. 10.

  29. D. Miliband, op. cit., Perspectives on European Integration—A British View, Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies Working Paper 02/02, Cologne 2002, pp. 22–23.

  30. H. Grab]be: Translating Ireland, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 4 July 2001, p. 8.

  31. N. Barry, op. cit.,, pp. 13–17.

    Google Scholar 

  32. B. Kohler-Koch, op. cit., The Commission White Paper and the Improvement of European Governance, New York University School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/01, New York 2001, p. 8.

  33. R. Mudambi, P. Navarra, G. Sobbrio: Constitutional Issues in Modern Democracies, in: R. Mudambi, P. Navarra, G. Sobbrio: Rules and Reason, Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge 2001, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–5, here p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Ibid.,, pp. 2–3.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Ibid.,, p. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  36. D.C. Mueller: On Writing a Constitution, in: R. Mudambi et al., op. cit.,, here pp. 23–27, R. Vaubel: Der Hochmut der Institutionen, in: Rheinischer Merkur, 1 March 2002, p. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  37. D.C. Mueller, op. cit.,, pp. 24 and 26.

    Google Scholar 

  38. R. Vaubel: Der Hochmut der institutionen, op. cit., in: Rheinischer Merkur, 1 March 2002, p. 8; R. Vaubel: Europa-Chauvinismus. Der Hochmut der Institutionen, Munich 2001, Universitas, pp. 126–134 and 190–200.

  39. A. Wiener, op. cit., The constitutional significance of the charter of fundamental rights, in: German Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 18, 2001, p. 9.

  40. R. Vaubel, op. cit., Europa-Chauvinismus. Der Hochmut der Institutionen, Munich 2001, Universitas, p. 8.

  41. K. Hughes: Is this Europe's Philadelphia?, in: Wall Street Journal Europe, 28 February 2001, p. 7.

  42. H.-E. Scharrer: Single market or National Industrial Policies?, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2002, pp. 66–67, here p. 66.

  43. The Wall Street Journal Europe: A good constitution, 28 February 2002, p. 6.

  44. A. Wiener, op. cit., The constitutional significance of the charter of fundamental rights, in: German Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 18, 2001, p. 7.

  45. H. Wallace: Experiments in European governance, in: M. Jachtenfuchs, M. Knodt (eds.): Regieren in internationalen Institutionen, Opladen 2002, Leske and Budrich, pp. 255–269, here p. 255.

    Google Scholar 

  46. F. W. Scharpf: European governance: common concerns vs the challenge of diversity, in: M. Jachtenfuchs, M. Knodt (eds.): Regieren in internationalen Institutionen, Opladen 2002, Leske and Budrich, pp 271–284, here p. 276.

    Google Scholar 

  47. H. Wallace, op. cit.,, pp. 266–267.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Lothar Funk
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

This paper was written while the author was DAAD Senior Fellow and Director of Economic Research at the Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham, UK.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Funk, L. A legally binding EU charter of fundamental rights?. Intereconomics 37, 253–262 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02928884

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02928884

Keywords

Search

Navigation