Abstract
Whereas in 1970 most of the large EC countries were still recording real growth rates in excess of 5%, after the two oil crises there was an appreciable slowdown in economic expansion and at the beginning of the eighties even a real contraction. At the same time unemployment increased dramatically. Where do the causes of the crisis lie? What strategies promise success in overcoming it?
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Excluding Greece.
Excluding oil companies. See European Parliament, Working Documents 1983–84: Towards European Economic Recovery in the 1980s. Report presented to the European Parliament by Mr. M. Albert and Prol. R. J. Ball, 31st August 1983, p. 14.
See also G. Großer: Die Weltwirtschaft im Jahre 1984, in: Konjunktur von morgen, No. 653 of 12. 1. 1984, which states with regard to Western Europe: “The obstacles to growth are now stronger than in the USA; a slowdown in the rise in labour costs provides less relief, so that the dampening effect of high interest rates is more pronounced.”
See European Parliament, op. cit. Working Documents 1983–84: Towards European Economic Recovery in the 1980s. p. 13.
See, for example, OECD: Economic Outlook, No. 33, July 1983, p. 25, which forecasts a real growth rate of 31/2% for 1984. See also DIW-Wochenbericht 1-2/84, which predicts the same rate of growth.
See also G. Großer, G. Weinert: World Economy out of the Doldrums, in: INTERECONOMICS, No. 1/1984, p. 48.
See Presse- und informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Aktuelle Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, No. 36/1983: Finanzwirtschaftliche Daten der sieben Gipfelländer.
See also Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Ein Schritt voran, Jahresgutachten 1983/84, Stuttgart 1983, paragraph 235.
Cf. ibid., See also Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Ein Schritt voran, Jahresgutachten 1983/84, Stuttgart 1983, paragraphs 34 and 36.
Cf. European Parliament, op. cit. Working Documents 1983–84: Towards European Economic Recovery in the 1980s.
Cf. ibid., p. 58. Albert assumes that the EC borrowing requirement is partly self-financing.
Cf. European Parliament, op. cit. Working Documents 1983–84: Towards European Economic Recovery in the 1980s, p. 58.
Furthermore, it should be noted that as a matter of principle econometric models are batter suited for investigating the effects of changes in demand conditions than changes in supply conditions.” Ifo-Schnelldienst No. 30/83, Gesamtwirtschaftliche Auswirkungen einer Verkürzung der Arbeitszeit, p. 14.
Cf. European Parliament, op. cit. Working, Documents 1983–84: Towards European Economic Recovery in the 1980s, p. 58.
Evidence to support this assertion can be adduced from the experiences of the United Kingdom before 1979. See K. Couzens: Die Wirtschaftspolitik Großbritanniens unter Margaret Thatcher, in: O. Vogel (ed.): Wirtschaftspolitik der achtziger Jahre. Leitbilder und Strategien, Cologne 1982, pp. 246 ff.; A. Ridley: Die öffentlichen Ausgaben in Großbritannien—die größte aller Krisen?, in: H. Rühle, H.-J. Veen (eds.): Wachsende Staatshaushalte. Ein internationaler Vergleich der Ursachen, Folgen und Begrenzungsmöglichkeiten, Stuttgart 1979, pp. 88 ff.
See K. Schiller: Aktuelle Fragen der Wirtschaftspolitik, in: WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, No. 3/1983, p. 120.
With regard to the advantages of part-time employment for companies and workers see also W. Gruhler: Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit—vortellhaft für Mitarbeiter und Unternehmen, in: Gewerkschaftsreport 7/83, p. 11.
The exceptions are the United Kingdom and Denmark, where the part-time ratio came to 15.4% and 19.3% respectively in 1979. In the remaining EC countries the figure was well below the level of 13.8% calculated for the USA in 1981. Cf. H. Werner: Arbeitszeiverkürzung. Eine internationale Übersicht, in: WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, No. 5/1983, p. 240.
Cf. Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände: Strategien zum Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit. Wachstum, flexible Arbeitszeitgestaltung und flankierende Maßnahmen, Cologne, 1983, p. 12.
Cf. DIW-Wochenbericht 16/83, p. 217.
See also W. Gruhler, op. cit. Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit—vorteilhaft für Mitarbeiter und Unternehmen, in: Gewerkschaftsreport 7/83, p. 11.
Cf. European Parliament, op. cit. Working Documents 1983–84: Towards European Economic Recovery in the 1980s, p. 68.
Cf. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin: Internationale Chronik der Arbeitsmarktpolitik 13, July 1983, pp. 1 ff.
E. Staudt: Eine neue Dimension der Rationalisierung, in: Blick durch die Wirtschaft, 27. 10. 1983, p. 3. See also European Parliament, op. cit. Working Documents 1983–84: Towards European Economic Recovery in the 1980s, pp. 27 ff
Cf. T. Baum: Staatsverschuldung und Stabilisierungspolitik in der Demokratie, Frankfurt 1982; and T. Baum: Eine politischökonomische Theorie des Staatsschuldenwachstums in Demokratien, in: WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, No. 3/1983, pp. 128 ff.
In 1983 the rise in unit labour costs came to 20.5% in Greece, 15.5% in Italy, 11.0% in Ireland and 10.0% in France. Source: Sachverständigenrat, op. cit. zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Ein Schritt voran, Jahresgutachten 1983/84, Stuttgart 1983, paragraphs 34 and 36., p. 22.
In the case of the Netherlands see, for example, Sachverständigenrat, op. cit., paragraph 37. The Board of Experts has the following to say with regard to Germany: “In relation to the value of all goods sold and added to stock, corporate profits improved to such an extent in 1982 and 1983 that approximately two-thirds of the previous deterioration could be made good.”
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Baum, T. Causes of the growth crisis in the EC countries and strategies for overcoming it. Intereconomics 19, 57–64 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02928294
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02928294