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Intereconomics

, Volume 20, Issue 4, pp 174–179 | Cite as

The lending policy of the International Monetary Fund

  • Wolfgang Wetter
Articles IMF
  • 67 Downloads

Abstract

In the worldwide economic and debt crisis of the eighties the International Monetary Fund increasingly became the “lender of last resort” for a great many Third World countries. With world trade weak and interest rates high, a considerable number of developing countries got into serious balance-of-payments difficulties. The demand for stand-by and extended arrangements with the Fund rose dramatically. The conditions or adjustment programmes linked to this lending not infrequently led to serious social and political tensions in the countries concerned. The term “IMF riots” was coined, and the conditionality of credit again became the subject of political and academic debate.

Keywords

International Monetary Fund Member Country Adjustment Programme Loan Commitment Lending Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. 1.
    Cf. John Williamson: The Lending Policies of the International Monetary Fund, Institute for International Economics, Washington 1982, p. 11.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    see for example Joseph Gold: Conditionality, IMF Pamphlet Series, No, 31, Washington 1979.Google Scholar
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    Cf. Sydney Dell: Stabilization: The Political Economy of Overkill, in: John Williamson (ed.): IMF Conditionality, Washington 1983, pp. 17 ff.Google Scholar
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    Cf. also Sydney Dell, op. cit., Sydney Dell: Stabilization: The Political Economy of Overkill, in: John Williamson (ed.): IMF Conditionality, Washington 1983, p. 27.Google Scholar
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  11. 11.
    Cf. for example Thomas A. Connors: The Apparent Effecis of Recent IMF Stabilisation Programs, International Finance Discussion Papers, No, 135, April 1979, and the comments on this subject in Tony Killick et al., op. cit. Tony Killick, Graham Bird, Jennifer Sharpley and Mary Sutton: IMF Policies in Developing Countries: the Case for Change, in: The Banker, Vol. 134, No. 698, 1984, p. 36.Google Scholar
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    Vaubel sees this view of “moral hazard” applying to all Fund lending; of. Roland Vaubel, op. cit. Roland Vaubel: The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending, in: The World Economy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1983, p. 294.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    For details, see A. W. Hooke: The International Monetary Fund: its Evolution, Organization, and Activities, IMF Pamphlet Series, No. 37, Third Edition, Washington 1983, pp. 33 f.Google Scholar
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    Cf. Wolfgang Wetter: Das Euro-Finanzsystem im Jahre 1979/1980, HWWA Report No. 61, Hamburg 1981, pp. 13 f.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© HWWA and Springer-Verlag 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wolfgang Wetter
    • 1
  1. 1.HWWA-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung-HamburgHamburg

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