, Volume 16, Issue 6, pp 269–274 | Cite as

Industrial innovation and foreign trade in the 80’s

  • Klaus W. Grewlich
Articles EC-US-Japan


The 1980’s will be decisive for Europe. But Europe, to use Valéry’s phrase, seems to be entering the future backwards. Not a few Europeans are beginning to worry about their political, economic and cultural future. Poor in raw materials and energy, burdened with a considerable downward trend in the economy and rising unemployment, confronted with a shift in the international division of labour, politically fragmented and only to a limited extent capable of action, Europe seems to many to be heading for “the decline and fall” which was forecast more than 50 years ago. But anxiety can be a creative force, provided we have the courage to analyse its causes and to transform it into tangible proposals for action.1


Trade Policy Industrial Policy Trade Deficit Industrial Innovation Bilateral Deficit 
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  1. 1.
    Commission of the European Communities (FAST-team): The Old World and the New Technologies, Brussels 1981; Peter Hall: Europe 2000, London 1977; Klaus Grewlich: Technology—The Basis of European Security, in: Außenpolitik—German Foreign Affairs Review, No. 3, 1981, p. 211.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    See Günter Schuster: Prospects for a European Scientific and Technological Policy, Council of Europe, 5th Parliamentary and Scientific Conference, Helsinki, June 3–5, 1981. It is recognized that such statistics on investment in R & D measure input rather than results. Current attempts to develop “scientific and technological indicators” (counting patents, analysing the production and diffusion of innovations, correlating R & D efforts with productivity growth) are still in their infancy; see Jean-Jacques Salomon: Technical Change and Economic Policy, OECD-Observer No. 104, 1980, p. 16 ff.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    See André Danzin: Science and the second renaissance of Europe, New York, Paris 1979; Commission of the European Communities (Report of the Study Group on the New Characteristics of Socio-economic Development): A blueprint for Europe, Brussels 1977.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Statistical Office of the European Communities: Eurostal Revue 1970–1979, Luxembourg 1980.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    See Wolfgang Hager: Westeuropas wirtschaftliche Sicherheit (Western Europe’s Economic Security), Bonn 1976. See also the analytical part in M. Noelke, R. Tayler, W. Hager: EEC Protectionism: Present Practice and Future Trends, Vol. 1, Brussels 1981; Ernest Preeg: Economic Blocs and U. S. Foreign Policy, Washington 1974, p. 27 ff.; M. Preisinger-Monloup (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik): Zur Politisierung der Internationalen Handelsbeziehungen (On the Politicising of International Trade Relations), München 1975.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Commission of the European Communities: The European Community and the United States, Brussels 1980; H.-D. Jacobsen: (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik): Asymmetrien und Interdependenzen in den Transatlantischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (Asymmetries and Interdependencies in Transatlantic Economic Relations), München 1980.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    For an analysis of the main problems facing the car industry in Western Europe see Georg Koopmann: R & D options concerning future problems of the European car industry (unpublished), 1981.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1981, p. 13.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    See for instance Robert Hormats: New challenges in international investment policy, USA Documents (US-Mission to the EC) September 23, 1981; see also Klaus Grewlich: Direct Investment in the OECD Countries, Alpen aan den Rijn 1978.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    See Financial Times, Oct. 9, 1981, p. 20.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    The OECD-Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry has—like many other national and international institutions—begun to work in this field. As to the US, see for instance Edward Graham: Technological Innovation and the Dynamics of the U. S. Comparative Advantage in International Trade, in: Christopher Hill, James Utterback: Technological Innovation for a Dynamic Economy, New York 1979, p. 118 ff.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    US Federal Register 1980.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    See Science, Vol. 213, July 10, 1981, p. 183 ff; also Klaus Grewlich: Technology, Industrial Innovation and Trade—An opportunity for a positive chain reaction, West-Ost-Journal, No. 1, 1981, p. 25 ff.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    97th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 109, January 5, 1981.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Eberhard Rhein: Europa, Japan und die internationale Arbeitsteilung (Europe, Japan and the International Division of Labour), Europaarchiv, 1981, p. 209 ff.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    See the Special Supplement to the International Herald Tribune, September 1981 (18 pages).Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    See Nobutoshi Akao, Maureen White: Japan’s Economic Security, in: INTERECONOMICS, No. 3, 1981, p. 155 ff.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    See Financial Times, Oct. 9, 1981.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    To some extent these policies are the EC-Commission’s response to the so-called “Mandate of May 30, 1980” (EC-Council of Ministers, May 30, 1980).Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    See in this context Giovanni Dosi: Technical Change and Survival: Europe’s semiconductor industry, Sussex European Research Center 1981.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    For a description of the FAST-programme see Klaus Grewlich: Forschung und Technologie bestimmen die Zukunft Europas (Research and Technology determine Europe’s Future), in: Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, No. 3/4, 1980, p. 10 ff.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© HWWA and Springer-Verlag 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • Klaus W. Grewlich
    • 1
  1. 1.EC-CommissionBrussels

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