Journal of Economics and Finance

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 1–12 | Cite as

The consequences of a policy of necessity: Bank regulatory forbearance, 1986–1989

  • Keith J. Leggett


While it is widely recognized that bank regulators choose the policy of forbearance because of an undercapitalized bank insurance fund, a key policy question centers on what were the effects of forbearance. This study uses a survival model to track capital deficient banks from December 1986 to December 1989, a period in which regulators explicitly used forbearance in managing troubled banks. Despite the contention that forbearance returns banks to safe-and-sound practices, this study concludes that forbearance did not enable troubled banks to return to viability. Furthermore, the evidence from the survival analysis provides negligible support, if any, for the interrelationship between forbearance and too-big-to-fail doctrine.


Large Bank Cumulative Survival Rate Bank Regulator Small Bank Bank Failure 
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Copyright information

© Springer 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Keith J. Leggett
    • 1
  1. 1.Davis & Elkins CollegeElkins

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