The Review of Black Political Economy

, Volume 23, Issue 1, pp 9–24 | Cite as

The cost of government deposits for black-owned commercial banks

  • Gregory N. Price


This article utilizes a Statistical Cost Accounting Model and Mean Variance Model to estimate the cost and potential risk impact of government deposits for black-owned commercial banks. The main findings are that relative to other types of deposits on the balance sheet, government deposits are expensive, and that deposits received through the Minority Bank Deposit Program may have the effect of increasing risk in the asset portfolio.


Total Asset Balance Sheet Equity Capital Portfolio Weight Asset Portfolio 
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Copyright information

© Springer 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gregory N. Price

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