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Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences

, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 333–337 | Cite as

Model checking electronic commerce security protocols based on CTL

  • Xiao De-qin
  • Zhang Huan-guo
Information Security Techology and Application

Abstract

We present a model based on Computational Temporal Logic (CTL) methods for verifying security requirements of electronic commerce protocols. The model describes formally the authentication, confidentiality integrity, non-repudiation, denial of service and access control of the electronic commerce protocols. We illustrate as case study a variant of the Lu-Smolka protocol proposed by Lu-Smolka. Moreover, we have discovered two attacks that allow a dishonest user to purchase a good debiting the amount to another user. And also, we compared our work with relative research works and found that the formal way of this paper is more general to specify security protocols for E-Commerce.

Key words

E-commerce security protocols formal methods computational temporal logic 

CLC number

TP 309 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xiao De-qin
    • 1
    • 2
  • Zhang Huan-guo
    • 2
  1. 1.College of InformationSouth China Agriculture UniversityGuangzhou, GuangdongChina
  2. 2.State Key Laboratory of Software EngeeringWuhan UniversityWuhan, HubeiChina

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