, Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 8–17 | Cite as

Leibniz on evil

  • Leroy T. Howe


Actual World Good World Ontological Argument Moral Evil Moral Perfection 


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  1. 1.
    Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,Theodicy, ed. by Diogenes Allen, Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, II, 122.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    John Hick,Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).Google Scholar
  3. 5.
    Nicholas Rescher,The Philosophy of Leibniz (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 45, argues persuasively that Leibniz insisted here on necessary being rather than supreme perfection because his desire is to preserve the freedom of God.Google Scholar
  4. 7.
    On this issue, see my “One God, One Proof,”Southern Journal of Philosophy (6: 235–45), Winter, 1968.Google Scholar
  5. 8.
    As Rescher (op. cit. ), p. 79) points out, Leibniz does not argue adequately for the genuineness of relational properties (properties not wholly represented by mere predicates), and unless there are such relational properties it could never be maintained that any two possible substances could be incompossible.Google Scholar
  6. 12.
    See my “Existence as a Perfection: A Reconsideration of the Ontological Argument” (Religious Studies 4, 1968, pp. 78–101) for a more complete treatment of this issue.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer SBM B.V. 1971

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leroy T. Howe
    • 1
  1. 1.Southern Methodist UniversityDallasUSA

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