References
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,Theodicy, ed. by Diogenes Allen, Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, II, 122.
John Hick,Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
Nicholas Rescher,The Philosophy of Leibniz (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 45, argues persuasively that Leibniz insisted here on necessary being rather than supreme perfection because his desire is to preserve the freedom of God.
On this issue, see my “One God, One Proof,”Southern Journal of Philosophy (6: 235–45), Winter, 1968.
As Rescher (op. cit. ), p. 79) points out, Leibniz does not argue adequately for the genuineness of relational properties (properties not wholly represented by mere predicates), and unless there are such relational properties it could never be maintained that any two possible substances could be incompossible.
See my “Existence as a Perfection: A Reconsideration of the Ontological Argument” (Religious Studies 4, 1968, pp. 78–101) for a more complete treatment of this issue.
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Howe, L.T. Leibniz on evil. SOPH 10, 8–17 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02804262
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02804262