, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp 61–72 | Cite as

Minds, programs, and Chinese philosophers: A Chinese perspective on the Chinese room

  • Koji Tanaka


The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philosophers don’t seem to share this same intuition. The paper begins by first analysing Searle’s Chinee room argument. It then introduces what can be seen as the (implicit) Chinese view of the mind. Lastly, it demonstrates a conceptual difference between Chinese and Western philosophy with respect to the notion of mind. Thus, it is shown that one must carefully attend to the presuppositions underlying Chinese philosophising in interpreting Chinese philosophers.


Chinese Philosopher Western Philosophy Folk Psychology Chinese Script Chinese Room 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer SBM B.V. 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentMacquarie UniversitySydneyAustralia

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