The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
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The existence of a Nash equilibrium in the undiscounted repeated two-person game of incomplete information on one side is established. The proof depends on a new topological result resembling in some respect the Borsuk-Ulam theorem.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Incomplete Information Inverse Limit Repeated Game Separation Theorem
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