Abstract
The existence of a Nash equilibrium in the undiscounted repeated two-person game of incomplete information on one side is established. The proof depends on a new topological result resembling in some respect the Borsuk-Ulam theorem.
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Simon, R.S., Spież, S. & Toruńczyk, H. The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type. Israel J. Math. 92, 1–21 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02762067
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02762067