Journal of Economics and Finance

, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp 240–250 | Cite as

Corruption in transition economies: Effects of government size, country size and economic reforms

  • Rajeev K. Goel
  • Jelena Budak
Corruption Symposium


This paper uses annual pooled data over 1998–2002 for transition countries to examine whether government size or country size matters more in its impact on corruption; and whether piecemeal reforms or comprehensive transition reforms are desirable for corruption reduction. Our results show that greater economic prosperity leads to lower corruption, and contrary to findings for other nations, a bigger government size seems toreduce corruption in transition nations. The geographic size of a country is positive and significant, suggesting that more spread out countries would have a harder time controlling corruption. Comprehensive transition reforms might work best at corruption reduction.


European Union Human Development Index Transition Economy Transition Nation Shadow Economy 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsIllinois State UniversityNormalU.S.A.
  2. 2.Institute of EconomicsZagrebCroatia

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