Journal of Economics and Finance

, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 133–142 | Cite as

Scaling laws, talent amplification, and executive compensation in the commercial bank industry

  • W. David Walls


This research takes an alternative approach in analyzing the distribution of executive compensation in the commercial banking industry. We make use of scaling laws—laws often applied in the physical sciences that relate the intensity of an event to its frequency—to quantify the distribution of compensation and to make inferences on the type of process that generates it. We find that the distribution of compensation for chief executive officers, chief financial officers and chief operating officers is consistent with the amplification of managerial talent. However, we find that senior lending officer compensation does not support such increasing returns to talent. (JEL G210, Y330)


Chief Executive Officer Executive Compensation Managerial Talent Chief Financial Officer Bank Officer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • W. David Walls
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Economics and FinanceThe University of Hong KongHong Kong

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