Economic design

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 41–54 | Cite as

2-person Bayesian implementation

  • Bhaskar Dutta
  • Arunava Sen


Social Choice Equilibrium Strategy Game Form Social Choice Function Economic Design 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Elsevier Science B.V 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bhaskar Dutta
    • 1
  • Arunava Sen
    • 1
  1. 1.Indian Statistical InstituteNew DelhiIndia

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