References
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin, 1979, The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility, Review of Economic Studies 46, 185–216.
Dutta, B. and A. Sen, 1991, Necessary and sufficient conditions for 2-person Nash implementation, Review of Economic Studies 58, 121–128.
Dutta, B. and A. Sen, 1992, Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms, to appear in Journal of Economic Theory.
Harsanyi, J.C., 1967–68, Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Management Science 14, 159–189, 320–334, 486–502.
Jackson, M.O., 1991, Bayesian implementation, Econometrica 59, 461–477.
Jackson, M.O., 1992, Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded mechanisms, Review of Economic Studies 59, 757–775.
Maskin, E., 1977, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, mimeo.
Moore, J. and R. Repullo, 1990, Nash implementation: A full characterization, Econometrica 58, 1083–1100.
Mookherjee, D. and S. Reichelstein, 1990, Implementation via augmented revelation mechanisms, Review of Economic Studies 57, 453–476.
Palfrey, T., 1992, Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design, in: J.J. Laffont, ed., Advances in economic theory, Sixth World Congress, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press.
Palfrey, T. and S. Srivastava, 1987, On Bayesian implementable allocations, Review of Economic Studies 54, 193–208.
Palfrey, T. and S. Srivastava, 1989b, Implementation with incomplete information in exchange economies, Econometrica 57, 115–134.
Postlewaite, A. and D. Schmeidler, 1986, Implementation in differential information economies, Journal of Economic Theory 39, 14–33.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Dutta, B., Sen, A. 2-person Bayesian implementation. Economic Design 1, 41–54 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02716613
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02716613