Abstract
Economic Integration, Market Size and the Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalisation. — This paper examines the welfare effects of regional and global integration in a model where market size matters. Regional integration leads to higher welfare in the countries of a preferential trading arrangement (PTA), but to lower welfare outside. In case the countries also decide to form a customs union (CU), both countries will experience further gains if the creation of the CU means that the average external trade barriers are raised. In turn, the outside country will in this case experience further welfare losses. If it retaliates and creates a trade war, this will lower welfare in all countries. In contrast, global integration mostly benefits both PTA countries and outside countries.
Zusammenfassung
Wirtschaftliche Integration, Marktgrö\e und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Handelsliberalisierung. — In dem Aufsatz werden die Wohlfahrtseffekte der regionalen und globalen Integration mit Hilfe eines Modells untersucht, in dem es auf die Marktgrö\e ankommt. Regionale Integration führt in den LÄndern eines prÄferentiellen Handelsabkommens (PHA) zu Wohlfahrtsgewinnen, au\erhalb aber zu Wohlfahrts verlusten. Wenn die LÄnder sich au\erdem entschlie\en, eine Zollunion (ZU) zu bilden, werden sie beide weitere Gewinne erzielen, falls die Bildung der ZU bedeutet, da\ die externen Au\enhandelsschranken erhöht werden. Ein Drittland wird dann weitere Wohlfahrtsverluste erleiden. Wenn es zu Gegenma\nahmen greift und einen Handelskrieg auslöst, wird das in allen LÄndern zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten führen. Im Gegensatz dazu nützt die globale Integration meist sowohl den Mitgliedsstaaten eines PHA als auch den DrittlÄndern.
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