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Review of World Economics

, Volume 130, Issue 2, pp 290–308 | Cite as

An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases

  • Robert E. Baldwin
  • Jeffrey W. Steagall
Articles

Abstract

An Analysis of ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases. — This paper investigates the economic factors that best explain the decisions of the International Trade Commission in administering the injury provisions of U.S. antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws during the 1980s. Utilizing the economic data collected by the Commission for each investigation, it attempts to ascertain through regression analysis how strictly the commissioners have been interpreting these laws in recent years in terms of the economic conditions required for finding that an industry has been injured and for establishing a casual relationship between imports and this injury.

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Zusammenfassung

Eine Analyse von Entscheidungen der Internationalen Trade Commission (ITC) in Fällen von Antidumping, Ausgleichszöllen und Schutzklausein. — In dem Aufsatz werden die wirtschaftlichen Faktoren untersucht, die die Entscheidungen der International Trade Commission bei der Anwendung der Schadensregeln in den US-Gesetzen über Antidumping, Ausgleichszölle und Schutzklauseln in den 80er Jahren am besten erklären. Die Autoren verwenden die ökonomischen Daten, die die Kommission für jede Untersuchung zusammengestellt hat, und versuchen mit Hilfe von Regressionsanalysen zu ermitteln, wie streng die Kommissionsmitglieder in den letzten Jahren diese Gesetze interpretiert haben, im Hinblick auf die ökonomischen Bedingungen, die Voraussetzung für die Feststellung sind, daß eine Industrie einen Schaden erlitten hat und daß ein Kausalzusammenhang zwischen Einfuhren und diesem Schaden besteht.

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Copyright information

© Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert E. Baldwin
  • Jeffrey W. Steagall

There are no affiliations available

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