Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv

, Volume 132, Issue 4, pp 723–739 | Cite as

Free trade or protection? belgian textile and clothing firms’ trade preferences

  • Ilse Scheerlinck
  • Luc M. A. Hens
  • Rosette S’Jegers


Free Trade or Protection? Belgian Textile and Clothing Firms' Trade Preferences. -This paper examines the positions of Belgian textile and clothing firms on trade policies. Observations on positions are generated by a survey. Along the lines of the political economy of protection and anti-protection we test whether firm-specific characteristics influence textile and clothing firms' trade policy preferences. The results show that international competition and having foreign establishments significantly determine firms' positions, but that product differentiation does not. A Chow test indicates no significant difference between firms' sensitivities in the textile and clothing industries. This suggests that the two professional organizations should co-operate on trade issues.

F13 F14 L67 


Freihandel oder Protektion? Die Präferenzen der belgischen Textilwaren und Bekleidungsunternehmen. -Die Verfasser untersuchen, welche Faktoren am besten die Präferenzen der belgischen Textilwaren und Bekleidungsunternehmen in bezug auf die Außenhandelspolitik erklären. Informationen über die Präferenzen ergeben sich aus einer Umfrage. Nach der Theorie der politischen Ökonomie des Protektionismus müßten unternehmensspezifische Kennzeichen eine ausschlaggebende Rolle bei der Herausbildung der Präferenzen spielen. Die Untersuchung stützt die Hypothese, daß die Präferenzen signifikant korreliert sind mit internationaler Konkurrenz und mit dem Bestehen ausländischer Niederlassungen, aber nicht mit Produktdifferenzierung. Ein Chow-Test zeigt, daß die Unternehmen in der Textilwarenindustrie und in der Bekleidungsindustrie nicht in signifikanter Weise unterschiedlich reagieren. Daraus ergibt sich die Schlußfolgerung, daß die zwei Industrieorganisationen besser zusammenarbeiten sollten, wenn es um die Handelspolitik geht.


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Copyright information

© Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ilse Scheerlinck
  • Luc M. A. Hens
  • Rosette S’Jegers

There are no affiliations available

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