Journal of Evolutionary Economics

, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 145–152 | Cite as

Dynamic R&D competition with memory

  • Engelbert J. Dockner
  • Gustav Feichtinger
  • Alexander Mehlmann


We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough.

Key words

R&D Industrial organization Stragegic interaction Dynamic games 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Engelbert J. Dockner
    • 1
  • Gustav Feichtinger
    • 2
  • Alexander Mehlmann
    • 2
  1. 1.University of BielefeldGermany
  2. 2.Technical University of ViennaViennaAustria

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