Abstract
How to transform a failed socialist economy raises questions about the processes of structural and institutional changes, which standard economics is inadequately equipped to study. An economic theory that can study both these processes is suggested and applied to the actual debate of how the transformation should be conducted. Standard notions of institutional roles (R) and organizational structures (S) are seen in a non-standard way as outcomes of two interrelated but distinct evolutions. Comparing different given Rs for their influence on S-evolution throws new light on which R should be the target of the transformation. Compared to standard analysis, the case against socialism on the supply side is strengthened, whereas the case against a redistributive welfare society on the demand side is weakened. S-evolution is shown to require more time and be more difficult to be helped by government than R-evolution. This clarifies several controversial points about the speed and the sequencing of the transformation policies. The study of R-evolution discloses an important cognitive constraint on these policies, which teaching of economics can help to soften. Standard economics, shown to be a special case of the suggested theory, is rehabilitated as the best subject by which such teaching should start.
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Pelikan, P. The dynamics of economic systems, or how to transform a failed socialist economy. J Evol Econ 2, 39–63 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01196460
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01196460