Abstract
It is well known that Albert Einstein adhered to a deterministic world view throughout his career. Nevertheless, his developments of the special and general theories of relativity prove to be incompatible with that world view. Two different forms of determinism—classical Laplacian determinism and the determinism of isolated systems—are considered. Through careful considerations of what concretely is involved in predicting future states of the entire universe, or of isolated systems, it is shown that the demands of the theories of relativity make these deterministic positions untenable.
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Byrne, P.H. Relativity and indeterminism. Found Phys 11, 913–932 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00727108
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00727108