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Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science

, Volume 3, Issue 3, pp 813–830 | Cite as

Product quality and endogenous firm objectives

  • Yi-Ling ChengEmail author
  • Hai-Han Kao
In Honor of Shin-Kun Peng

Abstract

This paper examines the endogenous operational objectives of firms in a Cournot duopoly under the consideration of vertical product differentiation. We consider a three-stage game, where the owners of the duopoly simultaneously decide the operational objectives of their managers to be profit maximization or revenue maximization at the first stage, and then, based on the objectives, the managers simultaneously choose the quality of their products at the second stage, and compete in quantities at the final stage. The equilibrium results show that, for high heterogeneity of consumers’ quality tastes or restrictive quality improving technology, both firms choose to maximize revenues and produce goods with identical quality. For low heterogeneity of consumers’ quality tastes or superior quality improving technology, both firms choose to maximize profits and produce different quality. For the intermediate level of the heterogeneity of quality tastes and quality improving technology, both firms choose different objectives, and the firm maximizing revenues provides a high-quality product, while the firm maximizing profits provides a low-quality one.

Keywords

Vertical product differentiation Quality Endogenous objectives Revenue maximization Quantity competition 

JEL Classification

D21 D43 L13 L21 

Notes

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Copyright information

© The Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of EconomicsNational Sun Yat-sen UniversityKaohsiungTaiwan
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsTunghai UniversityTaichungTaiwan

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